Michigan Journal of
Political Science

The official undergraduate journal of the Department
of Political Science at the University of Michigan

Established 1981
Winter 2021
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The Michigan Journal of Political Science gratefully acknowledges the support of Brian Min, Joseph Johnson, Dustin Hahn and the rest of the faculty and staff of the University of Michigan Department of Political Science, without whom this publication would not be possible.

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Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

Hello and welcome to the Winter 2021 Edition of the Michigan Journal of Political Science, the Journal’s 40th Year Anniversary. We are pleased to present you with seven pieces exemplifying the spirit of the Journal as outstanding contributions to the undergraduate discourse in Political Science. These pieces, sourced from hundreds of students across the globe, combine worldwide perspectives on contemporary issues in a non-partisan and academic fashion. Our work is reflective not only of the authors who have put together such amazing pieces, but also of our growing Editorial Staff who carry the same commitment to creative and passionate research in political science as was set out in 1981 at the Journal’s founding.

In this Edition, our authors assess challenges to the status quo. Politics is marked by competitions for power, and prevailing ideologies define the political order. Our pieces aim to contextualize the role dominated groups play in challenging these conventions. Pieces like “Religious Nationalism & Identity Politics,” reflect the perspective of Indonesian Islamic nationalists in their efforts to challenge the prevailing post-colonial ideology, while “Just Transition for whom?” analyzes the Canadian climate change policy debate’s submission to capitalist forces under a Neo-Gramscian analysis. These accounts are substantiated by creative argumentation and thoughtful research to give voice to stories that are often overlooked. By showcasing the successes, roadblocks, and failures of those with less power, we hope the Journal can provide a more comprehensive account of political struggles.

We want to give a huge thanks to our Editorial Staff for all of their hard work and commitment throughout the past months. This edition would not be possible without your dedication, passion, and precision for editing. The collaboration between our Section and Junior Editors has challenged and refined our best practices, while growing friendships along the way. We thank the Department of Political Science, and particularly Brian Min, Joseph Johnson, Dustin Hahn, and Briana Akani for giving us the platform and support to enact our vision for this journal. Finally, the Journal would like to thank Genaro Salinas Ruiz, Andrés’ grandfather and a former Editor-in-Chief of his own newspaper, for all his wisdom, advice, and guidance along the way. This Journal would not be possible without you.

During a year marked by continuing political change, we hope this Edition can offer multiple lenses to criticize the status quo. By looking to the past, our Journal contextualizes continuing struggles and offers insights on how resolution can start and end. We hope the Edition makes you question conventional narratives and consider the reality of the unconventional.

Sincerely,

Ambika Sinha and Andres Ramos Salinas

Editors-in-Chief
# Table of Contents

**Letter from the Editors** .................................................................................................................. 3

**American Politics**

**Community Land Trusts: A Case for an Expansive View of Reparations for Black Americans** ................................................................. 6  
*Sydni Scott*  
*Columbia University*

**The Surgeon General’s Report on AIDS: Fighting a Disease, Not People** ......................................................... 20  
*Brynn Hansen*  
*Columbia University*

**International Politics**

**Wartime Rape as an Expression of Hegemonic Masculinity** ........................................................................... 29  
*Rebekah Rodrigues*  
*Western University*

**A Long Time Coming: The Evolution of the Mexican Left and López Obrador’s Ultimate Victory** ........................................................................... 36  
*José Luis Sabau Fernández*  
*Stanford University*

**Political Theory**

**Why not Imperialism: Can Ethical Universalism Reject Appeals to Benevolent Imperialism?** ................................................................. 51  
*Jacob VanHelder*  
*Western University*

**Just Transition for whom? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Clean Energy Transitions in Canada** ........................................................................... 59  
*Pooja Kishinani*  
*University of Manchester*

**Comparative Politics**

**Religious Nationalism & Identity Politics: Understanding the Denial of Indonesia’s Islamic State** ........................................................................... 71  
*Nurrisha Ismail*  
*National University of Singapore*

**About the Michigan Journal of Political Science** ................................................................................. 80
Section 1:

American Politics

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Featuring:

“Community Land Trusts: A Case for an Expansive View of Reparations for Black Americans”

Written by Sydni Scott
Columbia University, Political Science Major, Class of 2022

“The Surgeon General’s Report on AIDS: Fighting a Disease, Not People”

Written by Brynn Hansen
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American Politics

Community Land Trusts: A Case for an Expansive View of Reparations for Black Americans

Sydni Scott

Introduction

In 2016, the median net worth of white households in the U.S. was $171,000. In contrast, the net worth for Black households was nearly ten times less: $17,150. According to the Census Bureau’s Survey of Consumer Finance, in 2010, white Americans owned 88.4% of the nation’s wealth. Black Americans owned just 2.7%.¹ Few political phenomena in the United States are as pervasive as the racial wealth gap. This enduring feature of American politics and culture permeates every major institution: education, housing, the justice system, healthcare, and employment. While progressive policy has expanded civil rights and equality for Black Americans, this progression is ultimately stunted by entry barriers to institutions that are necessary for the growth of generational Black wealth, such as in housing and property ownership. This essay is divided into four parts. I will begin by briefly describing the historical context that contributed to modern economic distributions. Next, I will address the dissonance between race-neutral and race-conscious policy and argue with examples as to why the former is ineffective. Then, I will introduce the efficacy of race-conscious policy through the lens of Community Land Trusts and analyze their potential impact on wealth building. Finally, I will discuss why now is the optimal time to advance Community Land Trusts as race-conscious policy in the United States and caveat its limitations.

Contemporary racial wealth inequality was exacerbated by a series of policies that evolved through the 19th and 20th centuries to combat nascent civil rights legislation and bar African Americans from building capital. Following the Emancipation Proclamation, Union General William T. Sherman’s Special Field Order 15, known colloquially as “40 acres and a mule,” granted freed Black Americans up to 40 acres of tillable land, and in some cases, an army mule to jumpstart their success in the US economy. Unfortunately, after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, President Andrew Johnson reversed the order in 1865 and returned the land to former confederate southerners leaving newly freed Black people with few options other than sharecropping for former slave owners.² This trajectory has continued throughout contemporary American history, as Black Americans have experienced disenfranchisement in almost every institution.

In this paper, I will focus on a series of policies implemented in the 1930s that significantly affected modern institutions of housing and the demographic distribution of wealth that ensued. Broadly, this refers to the New Deal, which granted access to housing support in the U.S. among other social welfare programs. However, several systemic institutions excluded Black advancement. The G.I Bill did not allow Black veterans access to the educational resources afforded to white veterans because of educational segregation policies. Likewise, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) instituted the practice of redlining in combination with New Deal government subsidies and grant

programs for mortgage financing. The Homeowners Loan Corporation, FHA, and Veterans Administration color-coded maps of metropolitan areas based on where it was considered safe to insure homes. All sections where Black Americans lived – or were proximate to – were considered too risky to issue mortgage loans.

In his 2017 book, The Color of Law, Richard Rothstein details both the history behind discriminatory laws and their ramifications on future racial wealth inequality. Essentially, these practices were justified on the grounds that if Black Americans could buy property in or near white suburbs, the value of those properties would decline. However, this was empirically inaccurate. Black people were willing to pay more than their white counterparts for properties because their housing options were already so limited. However, The Underwriting Manual of the FHA decreed that “incompatible racial groups should not be permitted to live in the same communities” and Black Americans should not receive loans. One example in Detroit showed that the FHA wouldn’t resume lending until developers constructed a 6-foot-high cement wall separating a development from a nearby Black neighborhood. Even prospective Black property buyers with sufficient credit to afford loans were barred from purchasing property in developing suburbs. In total, the government supported over $120 billion in housing loans, 98% of which were afforded to white Americans. These policies lasted from the 1930s until the late 1960s when the 1968 Fair Housing Act was passed, finally ending the policy. However while Black Americans were technically allowed to purchase property in predominantly white suburbs, the property value of homes in those neighborhoods had increased so much since Redlining was instituted that they were no longer affordable to Black homeowners who had been segregated into poorer neighborhoods with worse job prospects and education. White Americans on the other hand had been building equity in those properties that could be used to fund everything from college tuitions to entrepreneurial pursuits. In the Color of Law, Rothstein estimates that the houses in question are now currently estimated at values between $300,000 and $400,000, up from $75,000 70 years ago.

These effects remain relevant because accumulated capital and income operate differently from each other in the United States. To comprehensively evaluate the relationship between race-neutral policies and the racial wealth gap, it is necessary to establish how wealth inequality functions. In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, French economist Thomas Piketty first describes the distinction between wealth and income, or in other terms, return on capital and wage-based earnings. He focuses on this distinction because empirically, the growth rate of wealth has been greater than the growth rate of income, or the return to labor. Based on empirical research, Piketty modeled how when the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product in a particular country, then wealth inequality is self-perpetuating because accumulation of wealth is more profitable than labor-based wages. In 1910, this ratio was 5:1 and fell slightly in the following decade before rising again to 5.5:1

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3 Katzenelson, I. (2005). When affirmative action was white. New York: W.W. Norton
5 Rothstein, 2018
American Politics

around the time of World War II. Finally, it fell to below 4:1 in 1950, and has been steadily on the rise ever since. A concerning component of Piketty’s findings is that the only periods where inequality decreases are during those of mass social upheaval such as World War I and II, where capital was destroyed and reallocated due to the war.\textsuperscript{11}

Understanding Piketty’s economic model for inequality can help us to better understand why the racial wealth gap persists. In 2017, Black wages were 60% of total white wages and total Black wealth was just 5% of white wealth.\textsuperscript{12} With the current ratio of growth of capital to GDP at 4.5:1, the lack of relative capital ownership in Black families has allowed for white families to grow wealthier at a disproportionately faster rate than Black families, a natural consequence of the capital dynamics Piketty’s model describes. Although wages are growing, their rate of growth is not rewarded as generously as capital growth is in the US economy to yield a comparable amount of wealth.

I. Race-Neutral Policy

Having discussed the trajectory of discriminatory policies that contributed to the racial wealth gap as it stands today, I will move forward with the central argument of this section. A racial disparity that grew out of explicitly racist policies can only be rectified through contemporary policy that acknowledges race. This is in direct contrast with what are known as “race-neutral” or universal policies. Though worthwhile, they are largely ineffective at reducing the racial wealth gap because American institutions conform to the standards Piketty identified. Universal policies are still inherently organized to reward wealth rather than wage-based labor. This is perpetuated by our tax code’s preferential treatment of wealth over wages. The Center on Budget and Policy reported that the 2017 tax cuts created the conditions for a larger racial wealth gap.\textsuperscript{13} Since white Americans own more wealth than Black Americans, applying a larger tax cut to wealth would create greater returns for white Americans, despite the policy being race neutral.

Race neutral policies that intended to alleviate wealth inequality run into the same problem of skewing their benefits away from groups in need. For example, Social Security is a federally funded insurance program consisting of retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. It is undeniably beneficial to Black Americans, who oftentimes have fewer alternative retirement assets than their white peers.\textsuperscript{14} Further, there are components of Social Security policies that seek to rectify wealth inequality. One such program is the Progressive Benefit Formula. Broadly, workers with lower wages proportionately receive greater benefits than workers with higher wages. This significantly serves Black workers who tend to accept lower wages than white workers. However, even though the Social Security Benefit Formula is progressive in that it allows for low earners to qualify for a higher proportion of their pre-retirement earnings relative to high-wage earners, the actual dollar amount Black Americans receive in benefits is lower than for white Americans because of the former’s lower overall earnings.\textsuperscript{15} This disproportionate dollar amount means this policy does little to amend the racial wealth gap as we understand it from Piketty’s description of capital accumulation.

This dynamic is replicated throughout other political institutions as well. While healthcare policies contain no overtly racial language, its implementation ignores race in such a way that results in Black Americans being excluded from the benefits consistently. In 2018, the percentage of white Americans that were uninsured was around 5.4% while

\textsuperscript{11} Solow, 2014
\textsuperscript{12} Rothstein, 2018
\textsuperscript{14} Hendley, A. A., & Bilimoria, N. F. (n.d.). Social Security Administration.
\textsuperscript{15} Hendley, N.d.
American Politics

the uninsured rate for Black Americans was almost double at 9.7%. This is because the regulatory burden in the healthcare industry has disproportionately prevented Black Americans from obtaining coverage. For example, Medicaid is subject to regional stipulations, and in 2018, many Southern states with large Black populations imposed strict employment requirements for Medicaid recipients; individuals who did not meet the requirements were given ninety days before their Medicaid status was terminated. However, access to the job market is variable along racial lines that aren’t accounted for by using income as a proxy. A 2003 study from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that, considering candidates with identical merit, a white man with a former felony conviction is more likely to get a call back for a job than a Black man with a clean record. In response to the Medicaid policy alteration, a disproportionate number of Black Americans – 18,000 people – lost their health insurance due to their inability to obtain jobs that met employment requirements.

Many universal policies are not ineffective because of overtly racial language. Instead, they’re ineffective because they ignore factors that are most critical to the expansion of the racial wealth gap and the policies necessary to overcome it. They shape colorblind policy in a society in which race is one of the most salient social factors. As a result, even with race-neutral policies in place, the racial wealth gap has only worsened. A 2017 report by the Institute for Policy Studies found that between 1983 and 2013, Black median household wealth declined 75% and median white household wealth increased 14%.

II. Race-Conscious Action

In November of 2019, by an 8-1 vote, the City Council of Evanston, Illinois officially began its reparations program to the Black residents of the city. Any Black resident that lived in Evanston between 1919 and 1969 and was the victim of any housing discrimination became entitled to government assistance to fund the purchase of permanent housing. The funding for this endeavor came from sales tax on recently legalized marijuana. With this design, benefits are directly targeted at a distinguishable group of Black Americans, who were the victims of explicitly discriminatory policy. The program directly benefits the expansion of Black homeownership and, significantly, doesn’t pose an annual tax burden on Evanston’s other residents. While it was the first, Evanston has instigated a larger-scale movement for reparations that is ongoing at the time of writing this paper. This momentum includes HR-40: a bill introduced by Rep. John Conyers that passed through the House Judiciary Committee for the first time since its introduction 32 years ago.

One major contender to reparations is the funding of private grants that would provide financial aid to low-income buyers in either their down payments or their mortgages, leaving much room for increased sustainability, a necessary qualification for rectifying generationally codified racial discrimination. In this scenario, after making

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19 NASHP, 2018


payments to the mortgage and developing equity in the home, the original buyers can then sell the home for a price that will have become inaccessible to other low-income individuals and families, making the grant an unsustainable solution.

An alternative solution involves Community Land Trusts. Land trusts are non-profit organizations that seek to provide affordable permanent housing to low-income communities by acquiring multiple plots of land scattered across a specific geographic location and allowing for private development on top of the land.23 More importantly, the land is never resold and instead is removed permanently from the market on behalf of the target community. Because ownership of the land itself is never transferred outside the bounds of the land trust, it can support the permanent ownership of housing. The trust issues a long-term ground lease of the land to the owners of the property that typically lasts 99 years. This lease – a small monthly payment – is heritable, renewable, and mortgageable.24

In a land trust, private funders acquire parcels of land in a given city through either purchase or donation. They can fund the development of residential buildings and then put them up for sale, specifically to low-income prospects. Those buyers can then qualify for manageable mortgages on their property. Furthermore, they can invest in them knowing that the property value won’t increase beyond their means because home prices within land trusts remain steady as they are regulated by the terms of the trust, and not the broader housing market. While grant funding is only beneficial once, the terms of purchase in land trusts necessitate that owners either sell their property back to the trust or to other low-income property buyers. Therefore, an area of permanently affordable housing is established. Moreover, a 2010 study of 96 land trusts across the country by Emily Thaden and Greg Rosenburg found that land trust homeowners were 10 times less likely to find themselves in foreclosure proceedings and 6.6 times less likely to fall into serious delinquency than conventional homeowners, a result that is significant given the lower income limits usually locking-in land trust home buyers.25 To end this overview of land trusts, the last critical factor to note is that in 1992, an amendment to the National Affordable Housing Act endowed land trusts a formal definition that gave them access to federal funding through grant acquisition. After 1992, land trusts were allowed to qualify as a “Community Housing Development Organization” (CHDO). Because of this distinction, many more developments could receive funding from the federal HOME program through HUD to supply their operations and their future projects.26

This basic structure of a land trust is still distinct, however, from a Community Land Trust. A Community Land Trust (CLT) functions in the same way but is modeled with three core values: ownership, organization, and operation. In addition to residential housing, CLTs encourage the development of shared commercial spaces, including businesses and community centers. Most commonly, at least one-third of a Community Land Trust’s board must be composed of community residents in addition to real estate experts, benefactors, and business professionals, allowing for direct participation in decision-making and community control of local assets. In addition to the development of affordable housing, many land trusts are involved in a range of community-focused initiatives, including homeownership education programs, commercial development

24 Davis, 2014
projects, and community greening efforts. Furthermore, Community Land Trusts are developed based on the needs of the specific communities they serve and can prioritize anything from agricultural development to corporate pursuits. Having outlined the basic structure of a CLT, I will now evaluate the beneficial impact they have on Black Americans’ ability to participate in different sectors of political and social life.

Community Land Trusts are not entirely new. Established in Georgia in 1969 by Robert Swann, Slater King, and Charles Sherrod, New Communities Inc. is widely acknowledged as the first CLT. Since their inception, CLTs have developed around the country, and as it currently stands, there are over 260 CLTs in forty-six states, Puerto Rico and D.C. While not all race-based, these developments have enabled the gathering of empirical data about their efficiency and the impact they have on economic inequality. For example, Myungshik Choi published a study in the Journal of Urban Affairs in 2017 that explored CLTs’ effectiveness at preventing and slowing gentrification. The author used a population of all active CLTs in the U.S. listed in the National Community Land Trust Network at the time of the study and then compared four categories: gentrifying neighborhoods with no CLTs, gentrifying neighborhoods with CLTs, non-gentrifying neighborhoods with no CLTs, and non-gentrifying neighborhoods with CLTs. The qualifications for gentrification tracked the rate of increase of the white population, college-educated people, median income, median value of single-family homes, and percentage of owner-occupied units all against the corresponding citywide medians. He concluded that CLTs not only alleviate the effects of gentrification where it occurs, but they also decrease the odds of gentrification by 74%. In addition, the findings suggested that CLTs yield community assets in neighborhoods by improving their stability. It was concluded that CLTs serve to benefit both residents and local municipalities regardless of whether they are gentrifying. Lastly, Choi deemed that CLTs make for ideal proposals for community representatives as they increase racial diversity while maintaining neighborhood standards of middle-class ratios, educational levels, and homeownership rates. These community-wide impacts are also accompanied by smaller changes. Similar to Thaden and Rosenberg’s finding from 2010, the Lincoln Institute found that CLTs significantly lower the rate of foreclosure and mortgage delinquency, and provide stability for generational wealth.

This stability is critical, because in addition to secure housing, stability is also a necessity for growth of additional wealth-generating ventures like Black business and entrepreneurship. The Kauffman Institute’s 2016 report finds that access to entrepreneurial economic mobility is often hindered at the foundation. They write that, “95 percent of African American and 87 percent of Latino middle-class families do not have enough net assets to meet most of their essential living expenses for even three months if their source of income were to disappear. People of color do not have the assets to take the risk of entrepreneurship, to quit their jobs, and bet on a new idea.” Solutions outlined in the report include creating access to new social networks, alternative credit score methods, and pipelines for minorities to access professional education programs.

28 Palmer, 2019
29 Davis, 2014
31 Choi, 2017
32 Choi, 2017
American Politics

Community Land Trusts are poised to facilitate all of these growth solutions by fostering an environment of growth and support, cultivating access to new sources of credit, and offering educational tools to capitalize on newfound stability. Lastly, they provide accessible and affordable commercial spaces for developing Black businesses.

Despite overwhelming empirical evidence supporting the efficacy of CLTs and their impact on residents’ financial mobility, they are not without their critiques. The first of which is that without the ability to build equity as property value increases like they would have in the conventional housing market, Black homeowners are still undercut in their capacity to acquire wealth. However, following the housing market crisis of 2008, Black homeownership is at an all-time low, and the disparity between the proportion of Black and white homeowners is more drastic than it was when race-based housing discrimination was legal. While the ability to build equity is critical, as it currently stands, Black citizens largely don’t have access to homeownership that would result in significant equity building. It is more important to encourage Black homeowners where it is most affordable. Although unable to produce dramatic yields, not only are Black homeowners shielded from volatility in the housing market, but they also have access to financial options that are not available to renters such as a home equity loan or a home equity line of credit, both of which can be used to support education, entrepreneurship, or the pursuit of other properties. In addition, some CLTs allow homeowners to build equity in increasing property value as long as the local average income has similarly increased.

However, a more complicated criticism is often levied upon CLTs: the economic model is inherently incompatible with community-based ideals. This opinion has been explored at length by law students, community organizers, and policy experts., CLTs are perpetually dependent on donors, grants, or other outside funding because the money they earn from the land lease – typically $30-$45 a month from residents that live on the land – is not nearly sufficient to sustain the entirety of the land trust, especially if new land or development is to be pursued. Because of this chronic underfunding, CLTs’ ability to function is reliant on expertly navigating the esoteric and meticulous process of grant applications, both of which often require comprehensive tax and financial data as a baseline for eligibility.

While earlier I referenced the accessibility to HUD as a positive milestone in the trajectory of CLTs, as access to federal funding kept many land trusts in business, the ultimate effect has been the attrition of the founding principles of community. By the time enough administrative efficiency was established to engage successfully in the grant allocation process, priorities often shifted away from community participation and instead towards the bureaucratic process of pursuing grants and courting donors. In recent years, the leadership of CLTs has drifted away from duty to fellow community members and increasingly towards hyper professionalization. This has also resulted in a regression in the pragmatic outputs of CLTs that mirrors the increasing distance between contemporary, profit based CLTs and their ideological predecessors. While this isn’t a problem experienced by all CLTs, it is one that is inherent to their structures. Expansion of the program and the benefits it provides isn’t possible without economic growth and profit – the very antithesis of CLTs. This dilemma carries us to the fourth section of this

35 Davis, 2014
38 Davis, 2014
39 Foster, 2019
40 Foster, 2019
essay, in which I argue for the utilization of reparations funding for Community Land Trusts as a means of rectifying the weaknesses of both policies.

III. The Political Feasibility of CLTs as Government Sponsored Reparations

The solution to this problem is for local governments to step away from ineffective race-neutral policies and commit to the support of the construction and maintenance of Black Community Land Trusts in acknowledgement of their individual histories of racial housing discrimination. However, one final conflict remains: in contemporary politics, race-conscious policy has often prompted little interest or traction. Overwhelmingly, unpopularity among voters, particularly white voters, has been referenced and cited as the predominant obstacle to its ubiquity. However, public opinion about racial policy is dynamic and particularly favorable to progressive policy, particularly at this junction in the U.S.’s political landscape.

In a 2020 Pew Research study, respondents were polled on their opinions about policies that could rectify racial inequality in America; results showed that most did not support reparations. Even among white democrats, the percentage of people that believed reparations would be a productive mechanism by which to achieve racial equality topped out at 43%. However, there is one caveat to these findings. When polled, all participants were given a definition of reparations that involved the U.S. government paying cash reparations directly to Black people who are the descendants of slaves. I challenge the conclusions of these data on the grounds that it doesn’t demonstrate the complexity in race relations, nor is it representative of the model I suggest.

A fundamental inverse relationship exists between a perceived threat to white people due to the proximity of Black communities and support for policy that is at least presumed to support minorities. This grounds plenty of research on the relationship between public opinion on race and support for progressive policy. Rice University in 2001 described the dynamic of “group threat” in which white voters’ likelihood to support progressive social policy is directly tied to their feelings about the security of their status as racial majorities. In this model, white Americans are less likely to support social welfare policy if they feel that increasing minority populations will imperil them either economically, based on a perceived threat to their employment opportunities and increasing cost of welfare, or socially, based on perceived threat to their cultural values and social dominance. However, Johnson’s paper also introduces an apparent contradiction posed by a competing theory that dictates that increased exposure to racial diversity increases positive attitudes towards racial minorities and that interpersonal interaction is most effective at decreasing racial animus. This was proved empirically in the 1992 New York mayoral election, which showed that white voters who lived in racially diverse neighborhoods – and therefore were exposed to more racial diversity in their everyday interactions – voted for incumbent Black mayor David Dinkins far more often than white voters living in homogenous white neighborhoods.

To return to the question of popularity and consequent political feasibility, I argue first that the preconceived notion of reparations results in misrepresented data
American Politics

about support for the concept of this type of policy. Because robust polling data of public opinion on modern reparations ideas doesn’t yet exist, I will instead briefly reference changing public opinion of race as an issue in the United States and the degree to which Americans believe it should be addressed through policy. A Pew Research Center study conducted in September of 2020 explores this contemporary moment of racial awareness. While opinions on specific policies vary, several trends are noticeable. First, most Americans report having pursued some level of education on the history of racial inequality in the past three months, and overall, increasing proportions of Americans are acknowledging the impacts of historical racial inequality. This includes 49% of respondents who believe that the United States has not made enough progress in achieving racial equality, an increase from 45% in just one year. This trend is consistent across all racial demographics, with, for example, the proportion of Hispanic Americans increasing from 48% in 2019 to 57% in 2020, and the proportion of white Americans who believe racial progress hasn’t gone far enough increasing by a smaller, but visible margin of 37% to 39%.

Second, in addition to questions regarding personal opinions on race relations, the respondents were also polled on the degree to which they believed reinvigorated anti-racist activism over the course of 2020 will result in policy changes. 77% agreed, with around 1 in 3 respondents believing it would result in major changes, and a slight majority of Americans saying that they have been paying more attention to racial issues over the past three months. Third, and most critically, for every question asked, Black Americans were the racial group most likely to acknowledge the role that race plays in the inequality in our society and to support mechanisms for rectifying that inequality. While suppositions about increasing representation of Black voters in the American electorate won’t be addressed in depth in this paper, there is growing evidence of the increasing salience of Black voters in the US. The United States is currently facing a critical juncture in the history and future of race relations, and it must be acted upon to generate sustainable equality.

IV. Conclusion

The potential for Community Land Trusts cannot be exhaustively explored in this essay. There remain worthwhile inquiries into the effects of CLTs on communities such as their impact on participation in and engagement with the education system and the labor market. In addition, implementation across various regional locations requires research on varied strategies, such as mixed portfolios, cross-subsidies, and scattered-site models (Palmer 2019). However, in this essay I made a case for the inclusion of Community Land Trusts in the current movement towards economic reparations and other race-conscious policies in the United States. This argument is grounded in the belief that race-neutral policies are intrinsically unable to address the worsening racial wealth gap. These policies attempt to address a problem delineated by race with an ineffective proxy and therefore ignore the factor that is most central to the conversation about the racial wealth gap and the policies necessary to overcome it. It is an ideological flaw that begets pragmatic flaws.

In response, I argue that my solution proposes an expansive view of reparations—one that can contend with both the ubiquitous historical legacy of institutionalized racism and the dynamic and varied Black population that exists today. This requires our discussion of reparations to transcend the limitations of cash payouts. As I have argued, Community Land Trusts fill that role by allowing for access to a housing market that has

46 Parker, 2020
47 Parker, 2020
American Politics

historically been refused to Black citizens. They’re sustainable in that initial access is buttressed by future potential for affordability and security, and they are unique in the agency they afford to community members to represent themselves in the proceedings of the land trust. This line of questioning has not only intellectual merits in the form of policy devising and the pursuit of innovative funding alternatives, but it also addresses the enduring relegation of Black people to a second-class status in the United States. Although it has gone long unacknowledged, the United States cannot embody the ideals of justice and equality upon which it was founded until this inequity has been rectified.
American Politics

References


American Politics


American Politics


American Politics

The Surgeon General’s Report on AIDS: Fighting a Disease, Not People

Brynn Hansen

Introduction

When the first cases of HIV/AIDS appeared in gay men living in the urban centers of Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco, lawmakers did not see a sexually-transmitted disease, but rather a sign of moral degeneracy. In a climate where ‘homosexual’ was a byword for ‘anti-family’ and, by extension, ‘anti-American,’ AIDS’ deep association with gay men meant that calls for action by afflicted individuals and rights groups were met with passivity from the federal government. Pat Buchanan, the White House Communications Director at the height of the crisis, wrote in 1983: “The poor homosexuals. They have declared war on nature, and now nature is exacting an awful retribution.” The President and his administration notably resisted calls to control the epidemic; officials instructed epidemiologists in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to “look pretty and do as little as you can” in the face of rising cases and increasing discontent. After years of inaction and the deaths of 20,000 Americans, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop broke the Reagan Administration’s silence. The Surgeon General’s Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, a plainly written, 36-page document, represented a watershed moment in the history of the AIDS epidemic in the United States. It transformed the relationship between the disease and the gay communities it had predominantly affected at the epidemic’s outset. I argue that Koop’s conservative identity, the direct, factual content of the document, and responses to its release all contributed to the report’s decoupling of AIDS from the political quagmire that had hindered treatment and research in the first years of the outbreak. Ultimately, by framing public health above the moral politics of the decade, the report garnered national attention and transformed AIDS from an omnipresent, societal threat brought about by the gay community into a containable disease.

I. Doctor C. Everett Koop and the Reagan Administration

Doctor C. Everett Koop had never been in public office before assuming the role of Surgeon General in 1981, and yet, by the end of the decade, he had become a household name. How did a pediatric physician carve out such a distinctive position in the public imagination in under ten years of government service? The answer largely lies in the role his faith played in his life and tenure in Washington.

By the late 1970s, Koop had already become a noteworthy figure in conservative evangelical circles as one of the most outspoken critics of abortion. His seminars, books, and radio shows, made in collaboration with well-known theologian Francis Schaeffer, drew attention from prominent leaders in the religious right. Southern Baptist preacher Billy Graham was one such leader, who, just weeks before the 1980 election, drew Reagan’s campaign staff onto Koop’s work. Given Koop’s views on women’s liberation and the gay rights movement, both of which he blasted for “propelling anti-family

1 Francis, The Age Of Aids, Interview with Frontline, 2006.
American Politics
trends,” Graham and the Reagan team agreed that he would be an ideal candidate to represent the interests of the ‘moral majority.’  
Indeed, upon his official nomination in 1981, Koop’s reputation as the man who had “done more to mobilize evangelical and fundamentalist Christians than any other leader” firmly planted his politics in line with some of the most conservative faces of the new administration.

The selection of Koop as surgeon general had been met with skepticism even before AIDS entered the public eye. The New York Times condemned him as “Doctor Unqualified” and the Boston Globe as a “dogmatic Christian fundamentalist with the kind of tunnel vision that limits bureaucrats of any ideological stripe.” Some feared that his office would be used as a pulpit to encourage moralized medicine in times of crisis, and the Reagan administration’s response to this new disease did little to quell these fears.

On June 5, 1981, months before Koop would officially become Surgeon General, the CDC released a report on cases of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia circulating throughout Los Angeles. Three previously healthy gay men were grievously ill with a disease only seen in patients with severe immunodeficiency; two had already died. Just weeks later, cases of what would soon be known as AIDS were on the rise, while action from the federal government remained absent. By the time Koop entered the office of Surgeon General on January 21, 1982, there were over 270 reported cases of the disease in gay men: the beginning of an epidemic was taking shape, though it would take time – and cases outside of gay circles – for it to become widely acknowledged across the country.

Reagan’s inaugural speech in 1981, given several months before the first recorded case of AIDS in the United States, set the stage for how the administration would respond to the crisis. The President’s assertion that the “government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem” proved to be more than rhetoric. In carrying out Reagan’s small government vision, the administration cut the budgets of the National Institutes of Health and the CDC, effectively kneecapping a coordinated federal response to AIDS before the virus was identified. Additionally, Reagan’s ride into office on a wave of newly invigorated evangelical support made the chances of a robust response to the crisis even slimmer. Given that AIDS initially surfaced in heavily stigmatized populations of gay men, social conservatives in the public sphere were recalcitrant in the face of growing cases. Many feared backlash from association with an immoral disease, while others stood by the belief that avoiding the disease was a matter of self-control, rather than one of public health. As American deaths and infections rose, further silence from the President sent a clear message from the White House and the federal government at large: people with AIDS were “in greater need of moral reform than of new health information or policies.”

AIDS was not mentioned in a State of the Union address between 1981 and 1987. Despite growing cases among intravenous drug users in 1986, Nancy Reagan’s famous “Just Say No” campaign, which began the summer of that year, did not mention AIDS once. So pointed was Reagan’s policy of inaction that his first mention of “AIDS” in a

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6 Perez and Dionisopoulos, “Presidential Silence”
11 “HIV and AIDS Timeline | National Prevention Information Network”.
12 Halford, *The Inaugural Addresses of Twentieth-Century American Presidents*, 274.
16 Perez and Dionisopoulos, “Presidential Silence.”
1985 press conference coincided with deeper cuts into research funding.\textsuperscript{17} According to Fetner, “This tight-fistedness even kept monies for AIDS research and care that Congress had approved from reaching their destination. [...] Congress approved $8.4 million to screen blood supplies; the administration, however, would not release the funds.”\textsuperscript{18}

Even the death of Reagan’s friend Rock Hudson—commonly viewed as the starting point in the President’s involvement in the AIDS epidemic—did not mark an immediate change in his treatment of the crisis. In the President’s official response to Hudson’s death, AIDS was not even given as the cause:

“Nancy and I are saddened by the news of Rock Hudson’s death. He will always be remembered for his dynamic impact on the film industry, and fans all over the world will certainly mourn his loss. He will be remembered for his humanity, his sympathetic grief, and well-deserved reputation for kindness. May God rest his soul.”\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the President’s conspicuously indirect public statement, Hudson’s death brought worldwide attention to the disease. As Shilts, a \textit{San Francisco Chronicle} journalist covering the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, put it: “it took a square-jawed, heterosexually perceived actor like Rock Hudson to make AIDS something people could talk about.”\textsuperscript{20}

With the threat posed by the virus no longer hermetically sealed in one community, the comfortable distance most Americans had kept from the virus disappeared from under their feet. With the threat of the virus looming large in the United States, the cracks in the administration’s \textit{laissez-faire} response to AIDS were mounting. Indeed, by the time Rock Hudson died in 1985, more people had contracted the disease that year than in the previous five combined, 95% of Americans had heard of AIDS, and work by activists was becoming increasingly impossible to ignore.\textsuperscript{21,22} Rock Hudson’s diagnosis and death was a signal to the American public—and to the federal government—that AIDS could not be written off as a disease in gay men. The following year, Koop was instructed to prepare a report.

\textbf{II. The Surgeon General’s Report}

The report, addressed to “the people of the United States,” saw 17 drafts before it was released in October 1986.\textsuperscript{23,24} Koop, breaking with office tradition, wrote it personally in his own home; he sought assistance from doctors, AIDS advocacy organizations, AIDS patients, and personal advisors before its publication.\textsuperscript{25} Before distribution to the public, the report was to undergo two rounds of screening: one by the Domestic Policy Council, and the other by the President and his cabinet.\textsuperscript{26} Fearing that edits would alter the message of the report, Koop took unconventional steps to circumvent protocol. Knowing that the first body of editors would want to avoid unnecessary costs, Koop decided to “take a psychological gamble” and print 20,000 copies of the final report before any edits could be suggested.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Fetner} Fetner, \textit{How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism}, 52.
\bibitem{Statement} “Statement on the Death of Actor Rock Hudson” (October 2, 1985).
\bibitem{Shilts} Shilts, \textit{And the Band Played on: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic}, 588.
\bibitem{Rensberger} Rensberger, “AIDS Cases in 1985 Exceed Total of All Previous Years”
\bibitem{Gallup} “Gallup Vault: Fear and Anxiety During the 1980s AIDS Crisis” (Gallup, June 28, 2019).
\bibitem{Noble} Noble, “C. Everett Koop, Forceful U.S. Surgeon General, Dies at 96 (Published 2013)”
\bibitem{Koop2} “AIDS, the Surgeon General, and the Politics of Public Health”
\bibitem{Koop3} Koop, “The Early Days of AIDS, as I Remember Them,” 10.
\bibitem{Koop4} Koop, 11.
\end{thebibliography}
American Politics

a further 1,000 on “the best quality, glossy stock [he] could find in the royal blue of the Public Health Service” and brought a sample of numbered copies to the first editor’s roundtable. Koop hoped that when shown the blue booklets complete with embossed foil seals, members of the Domestic Policy Council “would realize it was going to cost a fortune [to reprint] and […] back down.” Koop also insisted on confiscating the distributed copies in the name of preventing leaks – ensuring that no enthusiastic aide would bring home a copy to revise or slip under eyes in higher departments. His wager and the editors’ desires to avoid discussing the scandalous content of the document in front of the women in the room proved to be successful. The report was approved and prepared for distribution without any edits.

Far from the moral censure anticipated by critics of Koop and the Reagan administration, the Surgeon General’s report instead centered its message on scientific accuracy and offered a direct discussion of anal sex, condoms, prostitution, and drug use – topics that were radioactive in the political arena of the 1980s. In forward rhetoric, the report touched on the stigma associated with the disease directly, stating that “at the beginning of the AIDS epidemic many Americans had little sympathy for people with AIDS. The feeling was that somehow people from certain groups ‘deserved’ their illness. Let us put those feelings behind us.” The introduction further acknowledged the controversial elements of the report without euphemistic language:

> “Some Americans have difficulties in dealing with the subjects of sex, sexual practice and alternate lifestyles. Many Americans are opposed to homosexuality, promiscuity of any kind, and prostitution. This report must deal with all of these issues, but does so with the intent that information and education can […] stop the epidemic of AIDS.”

The statement, “we are fighting a disease, not people” became one of the most lauded passages in the report and is characteristic of the tone that was to follow in much of its content.

The Surgeon General’s Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome addressed in clear, factual language, the symptoms of the disease, its transmission, and methods of prevention. Koop, who had been explicitly instructed not to address AIDS during his previous three years in office, offered a report that challenged the administration’s central message, with suggestions operating in diametric opposition to the so-called “family values” of the evangelical Christian bloc. The report outlined that HIV was not transmissible through casual contact, rather when “proper precautions [were] not used with sexual contacts and/or intravenous drug use.” It also noted that “although the initial discovery [of the illness] was in the homosexual community, AIDS is not a disease only of homosexuals.” This marked a divergence from the years prior, when HIV was so intertwined with the community that it was labeled GRID, or Gay-Related Immune Deficiency. This designation early in the epidemic did not only encourage increased alienation and stigmatization of gay men, but also engendered a political tilt to the research and treatment of the disease at a time when swift action was essential. Koop says as much in his reflection on the AIDS epidemic, attesting, “Our first

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Koop, 28.
Koop, 29.
Koop, 30.
Koop, 31.
Koop, 32.
Koop, 33.
Koop, 34.
Koop, 35.
Koop, 36.
American Politics

public health priority [...] became needlessly mired in the homosexual politics of the early 1980s and we lost a great deal of precious time because of this, and I suspect that we lost some lives as well."37

Though Koop’s report stated that the only certain means of preventing AIDS were abstinence, fidelity between partners, and avoiding intravenous drug use, it did not condemn gay men or the continuation of sexual activity. Moreover, in its outline of preventative measures against AIDS, the report went on to maintain that people should protect partners by “always using a rubber (condom) during (start to finish) sexual intercourse (vagina or rectum)” in a concise, non-judgmental manner.38 The report also cautioned readers against policies proposed to isolate the disease, which would have been discriminatory and irresponsible. In response to calls for compulsory blood testing, Koop wrote, “It can be expected that many who test negatively might actually be positive due to recent exposure to the AIDS virus and give a false sense of security to the individual and his/her sexual partners.”39 The report further cautioned against the rush for compulsory quarantining and requirements that individuals carry visible markers of their diagnosis in public spaces. In reference to the latter policy, the report claims, “AIDS must and will be treated as a disease that can infect anyone. AIDS should not be used as an excuse to discriminate against any group or individual.”40 This open discussion of AIDS and its patients was a watershed moment. As Shilts notes in And The Band Played On, Koop’s report signaled the first time that the virus and the communities it affected were discussed in “public health terms, stripped of politics.”41

III. Responses

Responses to the report were immediate. Brochures condensing its content, which were sent to all 107,000,000 households in the United States, marked the first time that the government distributed materials about sex and condom use to American homes.42 The report also challenged a White House policy blocking the use of CDC money for sex education that had been established one year prior to its release.43

Koop’s supporters were stunned. When the Surgeon General was selected to draft a report on AIDS, there was little suspicion that its contents would stray from the status quo. Indeed, the reason Koop received minimal oversight from White House aides was the assumption that his message would fall in line with vague statements about abstinence and rigid morality that had already been issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.44 Calls for sex education to “start at the lowest grade possible as part of any health and hygiene program” were particularly alarming to its critics, with many arguing that it would be a corrupting influence on young children.45, 46 Some of the report’s most ardent critics, including conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly, condemned Koop for producing a document that “reads like it was edited by the National Gay Task Force,” and maintained that he “should have kept his lip buttoned.”47

Conservative supporters of Koop were enraged with the report’s release to the extent that his former rivals were delighted. According to Shilts, “the Reagan
American Politics

administration had produced a certifiable AIDS hero.” Koop was flooded with requests for interviews and speeches by AIDS and gay rights activists who were thrilled that the government was presenting impartial, scientific perspectives to the public. Researchers, health administrators, activists, and gay community leaders were quick to praise the Surgeon General, all while anti-abortion organizations began to rescind awards they had granted him in the years prior. Koop stated:

“Suddenly I found myself praised by my former liberal adversaries and condemned by my formal conservative allies. Everybody, or at least those who didn’t know me, said that I had changed. Conservatives said that I had changed and they were angry; liberals said I had changed and they were pleased.”

Although the report received backlash from conservative activists and outlets, the emphasis that the mainstream media placed on the Surgeon General’s conservative political ideology circumvented arguments about bias in the text. At the heart of the report’s effectiveness was the credibility that Koop’s religiosity enshrined in its contents, a phenomenon that is alluded to in “And the Band Played on”:

“Koop’s impact was due to archetypal juxtaposition. [...] It took an ultra-conservative fundamentalist who looked like an Old Testament prophet to credibly call for all of America to take the epidemic seriously at last.”

Just as it took the death of Rock Hudson to bring to light the disease that had been ravaging the gay community, it took acknowledgment from a devout evangelical Christian to bring attention to public health policy and sex education. Given Koop’s leadership in the anti-abortion movement and his embodiment of the religious right, it was impossible to depict the report as a sympathetic gesture to the gay community. By embracing politically unpopular discussions of gay sex and condom use and avoiding rhetoric that was not strictly tied to public health, the report had effectively divorced itself from debates on morality and sexuality that had charged the discussion of the disease in the years prior. Perez and Dionisopoulos express that the “pronounced captious reaction of several prominent conservatives toward Koop was probably grounded – at least in part – in a recognition of the threat he posed as a conservative.”

Despite the clear success of the report, it must be noted that Koop, like members of the Reagan administration around him, had remained silent on the issue of AIDS for the better part of six years. When the Surgeon General released the report in October of 1986, he addressed what had already become a pandemic. 27,000 Americans had died from a virus that could have been controlled with earlier action and widespread education programs. The publication of the report did not curb the epidemic before it had disproportionately impacted the gay community, but it did contextualize the disease and the people it impacted outside of the rigid morality that had been stymieing the process of public health.

By the time condensed copies of the report were sent to households in 1988, the first advertisement for condoms had aired on television, calls for mandatory testing had diminished, and attitudes towards the public discussion of sex and sexuality had shifted. The report’s insistence on preventative measures, education, and an open-minded

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51 Perez and Dionisopoulos, “Presidential Silence”
attitude towards those with AIDS shifted perceptions of the disease. The media no longer depicted the virus as a scourge on select populations deserving of their illness. Instead, it framed it as a preventable disease that required the government to step in, provide long-term care, and protect the civil rights of those afflicted by it.\(^{54}\)

Changes in public opinion tied directly to the release of the report were mostly limited to shifting perspectives on public health measures. According to Singer et al., the most significant change in perceptions tied to the report and subsequent education campaigns was the idea that AIDS would become an epidemic affecting the general population rather than specific groups of individuals. They note that the report’s call for public health information coincided with an increase in condom sales in the years after its release. The impact of the report in this regard can be inferred by the rare mention of condoms by the media – including news, advertisement slots, and television shows – before the report’s release. Reporting on condoms peaked just months after the report’s publication in 1987; the study by Singer et al. therefore concludes that the Surgeon General’s report was effective in expanding public knowledge of the methods that could be employed to avoid AIDS.\(^{55}\) From a larger, symbolic perspective, the content of the report and the context in which it was released proved to be an important step in advancing gay rights. It also triggered a shift in the way public health campaigns framed the disease.

**IV. Conclusion**

When C. Everett Koop was asked to write a report on AIDS for the American people, his staunchly conservative worldview was met with considerable skepticism. Some, including those in the White House administration that Koop served in, expected a document that would skirt around issues of sex, prostitution, and drug use. Others saw the report as another opportunity to moralize the disease and circumvent demands made by the gay community significantly impacted by the virus. Had such a report been circulated, the message from the federal government about AIDS – that it was a disease circulated by gay men and that it infected those of poor moral character – would likely have remained until a new administration entered office. The report’s direct address of gay sex and drug use played an important role in the advancement of public knowledge about the disease, and its call for sympathy proved to be of material and symbolic importance to the gay community. The report ultimately underscored that the spread of HIV was not inevitable, and that the onus of the disease was not solely on those whom the disease affected, but on a system that had failed to act.


American Politics

References


Section 2:

International Politics

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Featuring:

“Wartime Rape as an Expression of Hegemonic Masculinity”
Written by Rebekah Rodrigues
Western University, International Relations Major, Class of 2022

“A Long Time Coming: The Evolution of the Mexican Left and López Obrador’s Ultimate Victory”
Written by José Luis Sabau Fernández
Stanford University, Political Science Major, Class of 2022
International Politics

Wartime Rape as an Expression of Hegemonic Masculinity

Rebekah Rodrigues

Content Warning: this article addresses graphic instances of sexual assault

Sexual violence against women is an essential part of armed conflict. Long deemed a by-product of war, this type of violence has only recently been understood as a systematic element of armed conflict by feminist and international relations theorists. International law has taken steps towards reporting on and trying sexual violence as a crime unique to other crimes against humanity, but it has not been successful in ensuring that pre-emptive measures are taken to prevent widespread sexual violence in armed conflicts.¹ The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) served as a turning point in human rights discourse, as it was the first time rape was prosecuted as a war crime, while the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) took the issue further by recognizing rape as a potential act of genocide.² While these tribunals succeeded in punishing those who committed and encouraged widespread sexual violence against women during these particular conflicts, a primary shortcoming of international law has been the lack of understanding of the institutions and norms that perpetuate these acts.³ No international body can attempt to prevent these crimes from being committed if they do not understand why they occur in the first place. Hegemonic masculinity plays a significant role within politics and the military in making sexual violence an essential part of armed struggle and subsequent victory.⁴ Defined as the norms and institutions that seek to maintain men’s authority over women and non-heteronormative men, hegemonic masculinity is well integrated into the military and other male-dominated spaces.⁵ This form of masculinity champions aggression, physical strength and sexual performance while condemning non-aggression, empathy, and other “feminine” qualities.⁶ While women will be the focus of this essay, as they have been disproportionately affected by sexual violence during wars past, it is important to note that men and boys deemed inferior or weak are often also victims of wartime sexual violence, largely as a result of hegemonic masculinity. As numerous scholars have noted, hegemonic, or military masculinity, is perpetuated to be the antithesis of femininity, thus often portraying women and non-heteronormative men as its enemy.⁷ Therefore, hegemonic masculinity in these spheres of influence allows for and encourages the systematic rape and abuse of women during times of war. It creates conditions where male soldiers and officers feel obligated to partake in these crimes. As a result, rape is used to demoralize and defeat enemy men, destroy the morality of entire communities, and cleanse communities of certain ethnicities.

It came as a surprise to many when the ICTY identified the mass rape of Bosnian Muslim and Croat women as a product of sanctioned rape camps initiated by the Serbian military.⁸ In this conflict, rape became the mandate of all Serbian soldiers.⁹ Despite this,

² Ibid, 83.
⁴ Ibid, 75-76.
⁵ Ibid.
International Politics

the tribunals’ reports identified men who wanted desperately not to rape and took no pleasure in the act yet still did so repeatedly. In “Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity.” Miranda Alison identifies hegemonic masculinity as being at the root of this paradox. Alison affirms,

“This expectation of aggression is tied to the socially sanctioned institutionalised uses of force with the military as the ultimate exemplar of masculinity: soldiering is characterised as a manly activity ... and it has historically been an important practice constitutive of masculinity.”

As mentioned before, hegemonic masculinity perceives aggression and sexual dominance as necessary qualities in soldiers. Therefore, when men refuse or even hesitate to conform to norms of unprompted violence, including orders to rape, they are othered by the majority. As Gaby Zipfel states in “Let Us Have a Little Fun”, American marines are often made to sing the rhyme, “One, two, three, four. Every night we pray for war. Five, six, seven, eight. Rape. Kill. Mutilate.” While such forms of male-bonding may not be acted upon in the absence of war, armed conflict creates conditions where this form of control over women is necessary in order to showcase one’s masculinity and prove one’s loyalty to the group. According to Lisa Price in “Finding the man in the soldier-rapist,” in militarized environments, men who resist violence are questionable and emasculated. In wars like that in the former Yugoslavia, men who opposed sexual violence were not only deemed cowards but “sissies and queers.”

Alison describes the importance of gang-rape as a form of male-bonding in war times by saying, “Gang-rape cements a sense of loyalty between men, and those who might not rape individually do rape collectively in a group assertion of masculinity.” She suggests that performing acts of sexual violence as a group promotes group cohesion by bonding men together in complicity, thereby making it dangerous for men who choose not to participate in gang-rapes. In the Balkan wars, some Serbian soldiers took sedatives and stimulants to enable themselves to rape and still wept while committing the act. Alison affirms that, for the victims in these situations, “self-doubt and uncertainty about [the soldiers’] actions and identity produced distress that may in turn have led to the men being even more violent in an effort to reassert their hetero-masculinity, their nationalism, their loyalty.” The fear of being deemed an inferior man or disloyal to one’s comrades for not conforming to standards of aggression is strengthened by intrinsic hegemonic masculinity across patriarchal societies and, in wartime, has catalyzed the mass rape of women.

11 Ibid, 76-77.
12 Ibid, 76.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
Men are also compelled to commit acts of sexual violence against enemy women in order to emasculate and demoralize enemy men. According to Alison,

“During times of conflict multiple binary constructions are formed; not only is ‘masculine’ contrasted to ‘feminism’ within a group and ‘us’ contrasted to ‘them’ between groups, but ‘our women’ are contrasted to ‘their women’ and ‘our men’ to ‘their’ men.”

Hegemonic masculinity within the military makes it so that protection of “our” women reaffirms one’s fundamental duty as a man and a soldier, while rape of “enemy” women is used to “symbolically demonstrate victory over enemy men who have failed to protect their women.” This notion transforms rape into a necessary function of war because, in order to wholly claim victory over other men, they must not only be defeated physically but also have their manhood destroyed. Dehumanization and emasculation of one’s victim has proven important in genocides for centuries, especially through the use of mass rape of enemy women, who are seen as the property of enemy men. In this way, wartime masculinity is reconstructed to not only allow, but also to mandate aggression and violence towards women in the most extreme forms. This was portrayed in the former Yugoslavia, when busloads of Bosnian and Croat women were sent back home from rape camps while six or seven months pregnant. To further humiliate the women, cynical remarks were written on the busses in reference to children about to be born. Many Serbian soldiers took pleasure in impregnating enemy women solely to prove that they were the superior man and to bring shame not only upon the women but also upon their husbands. In many cases, to inflict even more damage to the collective masculinity of “enemy” men, soldiers would rape and mutilate women in front of their husbands, fathers, and sons. Bosnian women recall being sexually assaulted by Serbian soldiers while their male relatives were made to watch. The goal of rape as an objective of war is not only to destroy women, but also the men who failed to protect her. The stories of women who were violated in rape camps or while their husbands were off at war have too often ended with these women hiding the truth from their husbands, families, and communities, partially for fear of their reactions but also to spare feelings. Many women who could not hide what had happened as a result of pregnancies or other indicators were left by their husbands and shunned by their communities. According to Price, these women bore the shame and guilt embodied by rape of the failure of militarised men to
International Politics

protect their homeland. The perception of rape of women as not only the physical and emotional pain endured by the women but also a male defeat has resulted in women being stigmatized by their own communities, choosing not to bring their stories to authorities, and some committing suicide as a result of the stigma and endured trauma.

Wartime mass rape is stigmatized because of its symbolism for failure to protect the innocent. While it has already been discussed how a woman’s rape is often treated as the failure of her men to protect her, the act of mass rape of women within a certain group, whether this be an ethnic group or within a geographical setting, is often used to represent the defeat of the entire community. Women have long represented the “body politic” of their communities, as a result of their roles as biological reproducers and nurturers of community and culture. If an army aims to destroy a society politically, they will aim to defeat enemy soldiers, who represent the enemy government and military. If an army wants to go further and destroy the culture of an enemy society, they will attack the main caretakers of this society: women. Particularly in, but not limited to, communities where a woman’s honor is held to a high regard, rape has the power to tear families apart, and if such incidents occur on a widespread level, thousands of families within a community are destroyed. Primarily in wars between different ethnic groups, races, or nationalities, destroying the cultural stability of the enemy group is necessary to accomplish complete victory. As a result of this, a woman’s body becomes a “battlefield both for a man-to-man fight and for a struggle against the whole of an ethnic, cultural or religious community.” According to Alison, “wartime sexual violence functions as a form of communication between men and a measure of victory and of masculinity, with women’s bodies the vehicle of communication, the site of battle and subordinate masculinities.”

Soldiers reinforce their own hegemony over men who not only failed to protect their individual women, but their community. In this way, the female body and its subsequent violation becomes objectified as to serve the purpose of men and the state. In the Balkan wars, women on the Serbian and Albanian sides were represented as being faced with the threat of rape by the enemy. According to Ruth Seifert, a prominent feminist scholar on wartime rape,

“This feeling of a threat escalated when the Serbs stated that Serbian women had been raped by Albanians. In the Serbian press, the rapes were described as an attack on the property of the national collective and as a violation of the holy borders of the Serbian nation. The rapes symbolized a border crossing on the

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40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
International Politics

adversary’s territory and marked an attack on the physical integrity of the nation.\(^{50}\)

Here, a soldier’s role is not only to protect their own women, but to inflict harm on enemy women in order to undermine the physical integrity of the enemy nation. The use of a woman’s honor as a symbol of the pride of not only men, but also whole communities, makes women uniquely vulnerable to the threat of rape.\(^{51}\)

In addition to the moral repercussions of mass rape, the act can have severe physical repercussions on not just the women but the entire community affected.\(^{52}\) It has been documented that in wars past, the systematic rape of women has been used to cleanse a territory of a certain ethnic group.\(^{53}\) In the Balkan case, the creation of rape camps by the Serbian government, which left thousands of Bosnian and Croat women pregnant by Serbian soldiers, has largely been understood as having served genocidal functions.\(^{54}\) In armed conflict, not only are children born of rape seen as symbols of the humiliation and degradation suffered by the community, but also as possessing the nationality and religion of the men who fathered them.\(^{55}\) According to Price, “the official policy of the Yugoslav national Army and the Serbian political elite was to regard the children born of genocidal rape as purely Serb.”\(^{56}\) In this case, women’s bodies were used for a greater political purpose determined by the state.\(^{57}\) For this purpose, male aggression is further perpetuated as necessary to achieve not only militaristic but also political aims.\(^{58}\) Of course, if men do not wish to represent their state in this way, they are not just “cowards and traitors,” but also “sissies and queers.”\(^{59}\) As a woman impregnated in Serbian rape camps recalled, “they told us we were going to give birth to Serbian children, and they would do everything they could so we wouldn’t even dare think of coming back again.”\(^{60}\) One woman was told she would “give birth to a Chetnik boy who would kill Muslims” while another was ordered to “go and deliver fighting Serbs.”\(^{61}\) As Price affirms, this practice makes women into “sexual containers” or a “kind of biological box,” where their bodies are violated in order to serve a greater purpose for the enemy nation.\(^{62}\) “It seems that for them, rape and forced pregnancy are not simply means of accomplishing territorial conquest but actually are territorial conquest, women’s bodies viewed as fertile soil, no different from farm fields.”\(^{63}\) Further, women were made to believe the rapes would fundamentally alter them biologically and culturally.\(^{64}\) One perpetrator said to his victim, “Now you will have Serbian babies for the rest of your life,” and those babies would be “Christians.”\(^{65}\) The belief that women’s bodies are “the pure terrain of religion,” in Islam and Croatian Orthodox Christianity made it even harder for

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{61}\) Ibid.
\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) Ibid.
International Politics

communities to accept what had happened to their women after the end of the conflict. To their families and even themselves, the only way to redeem themselves would be through death. In an ethnic conflict such as the one in the Balkans, rape becomes a perfect outlet to utilize the rage, violence, and aggression fostered in military men to carry out a state’s political aims. In this way, hegemonic masculinity becomes intertwined with nationalism, thereby inextricably linking one’s duty as a man to one’s duty to their country. As Professor Maja Korac affirms in her research that men are essentially victims of ethno-national chauvinism as a result of their “duty” to defend their countries. Korac writes:

“Due to the pressure of patriarchal values [soldiers] have to give themselves up to violence and hate in order to prove themselves “good” representatives of their people and nation, patriots, and above all, “real” men, men with “guts.” The intrinsic ingredient of such an ethnic-national ideology is violence embodied in militant masculinity.

Again, the mixture of ethno-national ideology and hegemonic masculinity does not just allow men to be violent but forces them to. This combination does not make sexual violence against women a by-product, but a mandate of war.

The very institution of the military makes wartime a dangerous context for women. The systematic rape of women during armed conflict serves multiple militaristic and political purposes, including the promotion of group loyalty, demoralization and defeat of enemy men, destruction of the morality of entire communities, and ethnic cleansing. These purposes are worked towards by men who are trained to believe that aggression, violence, and abuse towards women is their civic duty. While the United Nations (UN) has come to recognize sexual violence as a “weapon” of war, many UN member states continue to ignore the issue and its internal implications. Years after the Security Council passed Resolution 1820, which calls on member states to protect women and girls during armed conflict by “enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures ... training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence,” not much has changed, because the understanding of what causes mass wartime rape has not changed. Resolution 1820 treats sexual violence during wartime more like an individual issue and less of the strategic initiative it is. While it is important not to absolve individual perpetrators of blame, it is evident in conflict after conflict that a top-down approach, beginning with high ranking political and military officers, is used to execute such crimes. If international institutions want to prevent mass rape before the fact, they must face this as they would other global issues like nuclear disarmament and encourage states to use hard power to hold each other accountable. This may mean sanctions imposed on military and political leaders and suspension from international forums and organizations for states that are noncompliant. Sexual violence during war is a systemic issue, and while age--old military practices will not be easy to undo, the only way to work towards a solution is to target the root of the problem: the institutions that endorse it.

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
International Politics

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For Mexico, 2018 was a year of change and radical promises. To the surprise of many, left-wing politician Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected President with overwhelming support.\(^1\) In that same year, López Obrador’s party, the Movement for National Regeneration (MORENA), secured a majority in both chambers of the country’s legislative power.\(^2\) Yet the most surprising part of 2018 was not the victory of the left, but rather the almost complete fragmentation of opposition forces. Mexico’s two other main parties, the center-right PAN and the old hegemonic PRI, saw the lowest levels of national support during the 2018 election.\(^3\) Even when adding all of the opposition legislative seats together, they fall behind López Obrador’s coalition. Plainly, the left gained all the tools necessary to reconstruct the country as a whole.

Three years after its shocking victory, however, Mexico’s left has failed to bring about the radical changes often associated with progressive politics. While the international left is often regarded as a movement for progressive taxation and environmental protection, Mexico differs from these notions for two main reasons. First, the left in Mexico has a long history of struggle from which López Obrador derives most of his policies. The best example of this relationship is found in current support for projects that go against environmental sustainability. Echoing earlier left-wing movements, López Obrador has used his tenure to promote oil refineries while avoiding investment on renewable energies.\(^4\)\(^5\)

Second, MORENA was partly formed as a reactionary movement, as López Obrador positioned himself as the clear alternative to the existing consensus on how social programs should be delivered. For the most part, the debate focused on eliminating barriers to federal aid. For instance, over the previous four presidencies, both the PRI and PAN supported large means-tested cash transfers systems to aid Mexico’s poorest citizens.\(^6\) But instead of continuing with these programs, López Obrador made his name by arguing for a no-strings-attached cash transfer alternative for students.\(^7\) Similarly, Mexico’s new President replaced the Seguro Popular healthcare program of 2003, which provided medical services to all citizens that chose to enroll, with the Institute of Health

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International Politics

for Wellbeing (Insabi), guaranteeing access to anyone carrying adequate identification regardless of enrollment status. In both cases, the problem was not whether a service should be provided or not, as Mexico already had cash transfers programs and healthcare systems. Instead, López Obrador’s candidacy focused on how these structures should operate, merely reacting to existing policies.

This is because Mexico’s modern left-wing evolved within the PRI as a direct response to the neoliberal economic trends of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Economics were always a large source of differentiation across parties, with left-wing voters supporting redistribution and opposing large trade agreements as NAFTA. However, as a consensus evolved on the transfer systems mentioned above, the economic debate focused on how easily citizens should be able to access federal aid, with the left favoring increased coverage through less restrictions. On social grounds, voters agreed on policies such as a prohibition on abortion and the importance of gender equality regardless of party affiliation. Therefore, the key differentiation point for Mexican political parties comes from how to best implement welfare programs.

To comprehend these shocking contradictions between international and Mexican left-wing politics, it is crucial to examine its historical debt to earlier movements. In this paper, I will explore the evolution of Mexico’s left to explain its puzzling differences with common progressive values. First, I will reconstruct the civic unrest that resulted in the Mexican revolution, which still guides the left to this day. Then, I will focus on the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, arguably Mexico’s first major left-wing politician. Furthermore, I will use the 1988 election and the creation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to showcase the consolidation of leftist movements around a strong-man figure. Finally, I will return to López Obrador to show how differences with major left-wing ideals stem from longer tendencies in the country and a reactionary approach to “neoliberal” policies.

I. Promises, and Ideals: Labor Protests and the Revolution

To fully understand modern left-wing politics in Mexico, it is crucial to recount the overwhelming inequalities that inspired the revolution of 1910. Before Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata took up arms in favor of change, the country was controlled by General Porfirio Díaz. For 30 years, Díaz held a tight grip over Mexico’s government, generating both benefits and issues for society as a whole. This period was characterized by serious infrastructural transformations, such as the creation of major railway networks and bringing electricity to various regions. Unfortunately, these developments came at the cost of equality and social progress, while also incorporating corruption schemes favoring political leaders. During Díaz’s tenure, the country was unequally divided between a small, landed elite and a vast population of poor workers. According to some metrics, the top 20% of income holders possessed 60% of the country’s wealth while the


bottom 80% held the remaining 40%. In the years to come, reversing the unequal land redistribution would become one of the most important goals of Mexico’s revolutionary movement, just as in various Latin American countries during the 20th century.

The problems under Díaz were not only related to land-possession but also involved exploitative relations between bosses and workers. President Díaz often sided with large corporations which exploited citizens to earn a profit, thereby making his tenure one of the most unequal and oppressive times for the average Mexican citizen. Given these abusive conditions, civic unrest began to form by the start of the 20th century. In 1906, workers in the Cananea Mines of the northern state of Sonora organized a protest demanding better working conditions. These struggles were followed the year after by another protest in the Río Blanco Factory in the state of Veracruz. In both cases, the government sided with the interests of corporations and used force to end peaceful civilian movements. While the protests failed to bring about better working conditions, they served as an inspiration for the revolutionary struggle to come.

Díaz’s response against workers became the antithesis of progressive politics. Effectively, the pre-revolutionary era divided the nation between a large lower class and miniscule elite. The left, especially that of López Obrador, is meant to serve as an opposition to Porfirian ideals by siding with workers instead of private interests. In modern Mexico, left-wing rhetoric still divides the country in the same manner as Díaz did—with a large group of oppressed people and a small number of oppressors. Before coming into office, President López Obrador often talked about a small “power mafia” which ruled over the country and stacked the decks against the poor. Now that he holds the presidency, López Obrador shifted his rhetoric against a so-called “fifi” class (a partly derogatory term to describe wealthy elites who are out of touch with the citizenry), formed by the new conservative minority opposing his government. The underlying sentiment, however, remains close to the perils of Porfirio Díaz’s rule.

II. An Unlikely Start: The PNR and Cardenismo

The protests in Cananea, Sonora and Río Blanco, Veracruz eventually inspired the 1910 revolution which removed Porfirio Díaz from power. After a brief period of mobilization to oust Díaz, Francisco I. Madero, a politician from the northern state of Coahuila, was elected President. However, the situation was far from ideal. In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta staged a coup to remove Madero from office. For the next ten days, the country was submerged into political turmoil as Huerta had both the President and Vice President executed in what is now referred to as the “Decena Trágica” (the brief period between the start of Huerta’s coup and his arrival to the presidency). For the next decade, the country was engulfed in a violent war to determine its future. Eventually,
General Plutarco Elías Calles came into power and founded the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 as a means of uniting revolutionary warlords under a common ideal.\textsuperscript{23,24} The PNR was not a party in the traditional sense since it did not provide a clear ideological structure, but instead served as a tool for revolutionaries to access power without violent means.\textsuperscript{25} Due to this structure, the left grew within the PNR as a branch of the party for the next 40 years.

Under the PNR regime, party members identified with two ideological camps.\textsuperscript{26} More traditional and conservative politicians gathered around the figure of President Plutarco Elías Calles. At the same time, progressive members who favored land reform and other radical projects followed the leadership of General Lázaro Cárdenas, a politician and army man known for his left-wing ideas. It is important to note that, in spite of the notorious ideological differences, both wings coexisted within the same party until Calles, a crucial figure in politics even after leaving the presidency, openly challenged more progressive members in 1935.\textsuperscript{27} Cárdenas himself was an extreme supporter of the PNR, considering that the overall structure of the organization far surpassed his particular goals.\textsuperscript{28}

The left would not become an organized party outside the PNR until many decades later. In the early 20th century, the fear of a new revolution was perceived as more important than passing legislation. The PNR was precisely the tool to avoid these struggles, but it resulted in a person-based system where ideologies were consolidated around a strong-man figure. Such legacies have remained in modern left-wing politics with López Obrador crowning himself as the embodiment of progressive forces. However, historical similarities do not stop there.

In spite of intra-party party divisions, Lázaro Cárdenas successfully gained the PNR nomination for Mexico’s presidency in 1933.\textsuperscript{29} Running virtually unopposed, Cárdenas was soon elected President and became the first left-wing head of state in the nation’s post-revolutionary history. Most importantly, his tenure would become a constant source of inspiration for future left-wing politicians, including President López Obrador. In particular, there are three strategies of his tenure that survive in today’s political paradigm.

First, one of the fundamental policies put in place by President Cárdenas was a major agrarian redistribution system.\textsuperscript{30} Most of the reform came in the form of ejidos, communally owned patches of land given to a group of people to distribute among themselves.\textsuperscript{31} Those living in ejidos could not sell or rent their property, but they were free to live off the assigned territory. While ejidos mostly disappeared during the


International Politics

presidency of Carlos Salinas in the early 1990s, the underlying rhetoric that brought them about is still present. At its core, land redistribution was a statement on to whom the government should focus its attention. Instead of supporting the wealthy elites like Porfirio Díaz, this line of reasoning holds that the President should create policies for the poor, like Lázaro Cárdenas did. President López Obrador has used a very similar rhetoric, establishing that his focus is to support the poor and not the rich. Second, the government nationalized petroleum and railroads, pushing for major infrastructural projects to fuel the country’s economy. This marked the start of a left-wing defense for polluting energy sources that has run against the international leftist norm. In places like the U.S. Environmental concerns have become one of the fundamental aspects of progressive politics while in Mexico, politicians like López Obrador have long defended the fossil fuel industry as a means of securing large investment nationwide.

Finally, foreign policy under Cárdenas became an opportunity to signal support in the international arena. The best example of these policies emanates from the 1937 decision to grant asylum to Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky. In spite of Mexico’s close relations with the U.S., Trotsky’s asylum showed Cárdenas’ support for refugees and even respect for international socialist struggles. Eighty years later, President López Obrador also supported a left-wing politician seeking asylum. However, instead of a Bolshevik revolutionary, this time the President helped Bolivian head of state Evo Morales escape political persecution.

In these early sources of inspiration, we see one of the major differences between Mexico’s current left-wing politics and the international progressive movement. While rhetoric dividing the rich from the poor and support for other left-wing leaders is not unique to Mexico, the modern rejection of environmentally friendly policies contrasts with the rest of the world. This is in large part a result of Cárdenas’ most acclaimed policy decision: the nationalization of oil fields from American and British companies in 1938. At the time, Mexico was still recovering from its revolutionary war, during which various factions sought to defeat common enemies without creating a stable coalition. While the PNR had served as a formal agreement to avoid violent uprisings, small rebellions occurred up until the uprising of Saturnino Cedillo in 1938. Thus, while Mexico existed as a formal country, there were still large struggles to consolidate a national identity.

the smaller neighbor was finally able to start a fight. This was further strengthened by the recent memories of American intervention during Mexico’s revolution, as U.S. troops took over the coastal city of Veracruz and crossed the Rio Grande to try to capture General Pancho Villa. All these factors made oil production a sign of national triumph after nationalization; a legacy so strong that even today President López Obrador pushes for Mexico to build oil refineries against international trends.

### III. To Party or not to Party? A Question for “Strong-men”

After the Cárdenas years, Mexican left-wing politics would continue their endeavors as a branch of the PNR, which eventually changed its name to the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) in 1946. The heir of the progressive move was Cárdenas’ own son, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who began his career within the PRI. However, Cuauhtémoc experienced a drastic change in the party: the rise of neoliberalism. In the 1980s, President Miguel de la Madrid shifted the party towards new economic policies which favored free markets over state intervention. To oppose these tendencies, Cuauhtémoc founded the “Corriente Democrática” (the Democratic Current), a group of PRI militants focused on bringing left-wing ideals back into the party. However, despite his efforts, he proved to be unsuccessful as neoliberalism became the PRI’s new norm. In 1987, Cuauhtémoc abandoned the PRI to run for President against the party’s nominee Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Instead of founding a new left-wing organization, various small left-wing parties supported Cuauhtémoc as their 1988 nominee in a coalition known as the National Democratic Front (FDN). This marked the first major attempt of left-wing forces to compete outside of the PRI party structure.

The 1988 presidential election became one of the most controversial periods of Mexican history. Halfway through election night, the vote tallying system crashed only to come back online hours later to grant the PRI an overwhelming victory. Shockingly, President de la Madrid would later admit in his memoirs that the PRI was involved in the electoral fraud of 1988, but that it is unclear to what extent the PRI shifted the results. Mexico will never know if Cuauhtémoc would have been elected in 1988 or whether the PRI modified the election to win a majority of seats in the nation’s congress. The one truth we do know is that it forced the left to unite.

One year after the fraud, Cuauhtémoc founded the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) which became the first major left-wing party in the nation’s history.

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International Politics

Through this party, the left was able to elect various governors across Mexico, although this was mostly because they nominated former PRI politicians that failed to gain the party’s nomination. It also allowed Cuauhtémoc to run for President two more times in the elections of 1994 and 2000, both of which he lost. But perhaps most importantly, it proved the left could unite under the figure of a single leader such as Cuauhtémoc. Even after forming a party, the left was still heavily dependent on the rule of a “strong-man” leader, a vice that lives on to this day. López Obrador spent most of his political career inside the PRD and even secured his first two bids for the presidency through the party. After he left the PRD in 2012, he followed a path similar to Cuauhtémoc’s in creating his Movement for National Regeneration (MORENA) and placing himself as the uniting force across the left.

IV. The Missing Link: Putting History and Reactionary Approaches Together

While the legacy of both Lázaro and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has certainly influenced modern left-wing politics, there is still an important side of the story to consider: López Obrador’s presidential campaigns. After Cuauhtémoc lost three consecutive elections, the left needed a new uniting figure. Starting in 2000, López Obrador did just that by becoming the leader of Mexico City’s government and a heavy weight in the progressive arena. By 2006, he secured the PRD nomination for the presidency, competing against Felipe Calderón of the PAN and Roberto Madrazo of the PRI. In the end, Calderón was elected President by a margin of less than 1% of the votes, resulting in a new wave of electoral controversies. López Obrador rejected the election results and organized massive protests in Mexico City, going as far as celebrating his own inauguration ceremony in the city’s biggest plaza.

The 2006 election divided Mexico across ideological lines, becoming one of the biggest controversies in the nation’s recent history. The ghost of electoral fraud lurked heavily on the consciousness of Mexican citizens, with a 2018 poll finding that 24% of Mexicans strongly believed the 2006 election was stolen and another 32% believed that there was some truth to López Obrador’s accusations. While the protests eventually stopped, López Obrador quickly adapted his rhetoric to the situation. For the next six years, the left became not only an ideological consequence of the Cárdenas years, but also a response to the Calderón administration and its recent predecessors. When the government declared a violent war against drug cartels, which would result in a total of

250,000 deaths, López Obrador argued for a conference to explore peaceful alternatives. During his 2018 presidential bid, he even called to “trade guns with hugs” as an alternative to existing government policies.

The reactions to his predecessor would go far beyond Mexico’s campaign against drug lords. On the broadest level, López Obrador would base his future campaigns on the importance of prosecuting high-ranking politicians for corruption charges, even spearheading a national plebiscite on whether former Presidents should be put to trial in 2021. Ideologically, his contrasts with neoliberalism would be twofold. First, as mentioned in previous sections, López Obrador criticized the cash transfer programs expanded by the PAN presidencies, instead favoring a no-strings attached system. Second, the current President became a force against Mexico’s free trade agenda with developed nations, openly admitting his opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at the time. Above all, López Obrador would grow into a strong critic of the democratic institutions implemented by his predecessors, focusing instead on the independent National Electoral Institute (INE). In the first years of his administration, the President has made constant attacks against the INE, perceiving it as an organization threatening democratic stability.

For those hoping to fully grasp López Obrador’s complex relationship with left-wing politics, it is important to recognize the situations that preceded his presidency. The man behind the presidential banner is one haunted by the legacy of mythical progressive politicians and the presidencies of his recent predecessors. On the one hand, he has inherited a long tradition of progressive politics dating back to the Cárdenas presidency in 1934. From here, the left has taken its fondness for Mexico’s oil sector and favoring the poor over a small elite. On the other hand, López Obrador created a reactionary movement to the right-wing administrations that preceded his tenure.

While Mexico’s current President is just one man, it is one who sees himself as the embodiment of over a century of Mexican history. His own administration has proclaimed itself Mexico’s “fourth transformation” after the war for independence, the war of reform, and the revolution. López Obrador constantly invokes the past. Since the late 1980s, when he was a young member of the PRD, López Obrador has become a part of Mexico’s history. From the inequalities that plagued the revolution, to the electoral frauds he perceives against his ideals, the President finds himself trying to reconcile ideas of previous years in a modern world that has far evolved them.
Mexican leftist politics are a multifaceted phenomenon which, now more than ever, must be explored in light of their success. While past experiences do not account for all of the stark contrasts with other progressive movements, it certainly serves as a starting point for further analysis. After decades of political ascent, López Obrador achieved his goal of gaining Mexico’s highest office. In doing so, he has brought historical and political baggage to Mexico’s presidential palace. Whether his ultimate victory will let him sort out these problems remains to be observed in years to come.
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Section 3:

Political Theory

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Featuring:

“Why not Imperialism: Can Ethical Universalism Reject Appeals to Benevolent Imperialism?”

Written by Jacob VanHelder
Western University, Political Science Major, Class of 2021

“Just Transition for whom? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Clean Energy Transitions in Canada”

Written by Pooja Kishinani
University of Manchester, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Major, Class of 2021
There are two general ethical frameworks one can take when discussing the merits of nationalism and the duties we owe to our compatriots: ethical particularism and ethical universalism. The former holds that we have special duties towards our co-nationals, while the latter holds that our nationality is not an ethical community in which special duties can arise. David Miller levies the criticism against the ethical universalists, arguing that in situations where:

“many existing states signal fail to protect the basic rights of their members, and given that on universalist grounds we can attach no intrinsic value to the obligations of community or to national self-determination, why not subject the members of these states to benign outside rule?”

Miller later calls this benign outside rule ‘benevolent imperialism,’ a term employed throughout this essay. Within Miller’s appeal, there is a claim that when one assumes an ethical framework that rejects the moral significance of individual relations, practices we would normally find unjustifiable can be legitimised. Here, Miller places the ethical universalist in a contradictory position, showing that a compromise view between the two positions might operate as the best theoretical alternative to ethical universalism, while also calling into question the efficacy of abstract moral considerations. This essay examines possible arguments made through ‘universalist grounds’ in order to show that ethical universalism cannot delegitimise imperialist practices.

In this paper, I start by defining the distinction between the nation and the state. Next, I discuss how nations exist as socially constructed entities, which will serve to lay the foundation for questioning ethical particularism and ethical universalism. Within this, I will define ethical particularism and ethical universalism and examine the criticism that each levies on one another. These criticisms segue into Miller’s criticism of ethical universalism and its inability to delegitimise imperialist practices. Finally, I will evaluate potential responses to Miller’s critique, specifically whether a state is capable of delegitimising foreign rule while simultaneously not providing grounds for partiality under ethical universalism.

In discussing nationalism, it is essential to distinguish the nation from the state. While both concepts are sometimes used synonymously, the nation and the state are defined differently for this paper’s purpose. A ‘nation’ is a body of people all sharing a common descent, culture, history and language, usually centralized within a region or territory. A ‘state’ refers to a political community that is self-governing which can consist of many different groups. Nation-states combine the two concepts, where a relatively homogenous body of people who share the same culture and history also exercise a high degree of independence and self-governance. However, some nations exist within broader communities under a single state. For example, the province of Quebec is considered a nation within the state of Canada. The province of Quebec works to maintain the

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province’s French-Canadian cultural history despite English-Canadian cultural domination in the rest of Canada. The indigenous groups within the state of Canada are also considered nations, as each indigenous nation shares a common history and culture distinct from other communities within the Canadian state.

However, the distinction between nations and states becomes less clear when considering the role states play in creating nations and a unifying national character. A nation and feelings of nationality serve as social constructs, as the concept of the nation is not discoverable outside an individual’s feelings of belonging to a distinct group. While nations exist, they do not exist outside of human social interactions and classifications. While these classifications can incorporate certain objective characteristics such as where a person lives or what language a person speaks, none of these characteristics of the nation are sufficient on their own to define a sense of national belonging. The creation of a nation is largely the product of efforts by state actors to create national sentiments. The state needs to craft a sense of subjective national identity that is based on objective social characteristics, such as language, and use those characteristics as a way to create a “distinct group [where] belonging...is a constitutive part of each member’s individual identity.”

The critical point here is that we do not want to conflate the state, which primarily concerns itself with administrative duties, and the nation, which primarily deals with how people identify and belong to a distinct group. However, when we talk about nationalism, we find that this term tends to conflate loyalty to co-nationals and feelings of loyalty to the state as being the same.

Here, nationalism as a theoretical distinction “refers to a cluster of beliefs about the normative significance of nations and nationality.” A nationalist grants moral significance to the nation, and one’s nationality adheres to a form of ethical particularism. The nationalist claim is that “we are not all morally equidistant from each other” and that inequality of moral distance gives someone in close moral proximity a reason to act partially towards each other. The ethical particularist view similarly “holds that relations between persons are part of the basic subject matter of ethics.” The basis of this view comes from the idea that our associations inform a great deal of the decisions we make with different groups and individuals. Friends, family, and voluntary associations, to name a few, all include commitments by which our lives are shaped, have moral significance, and play a factor in moral decision-making. The nation is one of these associations, making it an ethical community where individuals are permitted to show partiality. A nationalist would agree with this characterization, as they see moral permissibility and perhaps even a duty to act partially towards members of one’s nation. Nationalists adhere to an ethical framework that justifies special duties to their fellow countrymen or co-nationals over foreigners. Following this, nationalists would argue that the right to self-determination is a fundamental right of the nation, as self-determination is both necessary to determine the character and direction of their particular nation and fulfill the special obligations each member has to their co-nationals.

The opposing view that challenges ethical particularism is ethical universalism. This view holds that moral principles must be held universally. Therefore, someone’s relationship to you has no significance and demands no consideration in ethical decision-making. Here, this view makes it so that “only the general facts about other individuals can serve to determine duties towards them.” This translates to rejecting an individual’s relation to you as morally significant. For example, if someone requires aid, the urgency

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7 Miller, *On Nationality*, 51.
Political Theory

of that need would be a superseding characteristic to consider in deciding who should receive aid.

Rather, the ethical universalist would see the particularist view as arbitrary on three counts. First, the particularist applies moral principle arbitrarily based on “sentiment, prejudice [and] convention.” These factors are dubious and do not create a basis for consistent application of moral principles, particularly if the nation in question has, in large part, been socially constructed. For universalists, because partiality towards co-nationals is fundamentally arbitrary, we ought to reconstruct an entity that is more inclusive so that everyone is deserving of equal moral consideration. Secondly, the particularist’s justifications for partial applications of moral principles lend themselves well to maintaining moral conservatism. The reasoning behind this critique is that particularist justifications of special duties towards co-nationals leave little room for the expansion of ethical relations, which might benefit the interests of dominant groups within those nations or the states’ ability to monopolize cultural change.

The final major critique of particularism from universalists is that there is an element of “incoherence” inherent in the particularist position that offers no framework to prioritize our commitments and relationships. For persons who have multiple conflicting duties and commitments, particularism’s lack of prioritization leaves them without guidance on which duties take precedence. For example, one might say familial duties take precedence over all other duties, but this statement problematically appeals to a common understanding of how we prioritize commitments. This appeal gives a guise of universality in our internalized hierarchy of commitments. However, this is far from an objective understanding of how we should prioritize commitments. Indeed, the particularist cannot clarify how we ought to prioritize our commitments, as it is a question for each person to answer individually. For example, if we expand our scope to the national obligations that a French Canadian would have, we would see that the level of national commitment towards the province compared to Canada as a whole would be prioritized differently from person to person. It would be hard for a particularist to justify any significant claim to a hierarchy of obligations between the obligations to French Canadians on one hand and Canadians on the other, as both are co-nationals but in different ways. Our French Canadian in question might practice greater partiality to one group, but this prioritization is based on personal sentiments and judgments specific to that person. Even within the individual, their sentiments and feelings towards certain commitments are likely to change over time.

Conversely, the ethical particularists are also in a position to levy criticisms towards ethical universalism. One such criticism is that ethical universalism upholds an “implausible picture of morality.” This stems from the fact that the universalists must abstract moral principles so that they can be applied universally and impartially, ignoring the complexities and realities of moral decision-making that arise due to people’s voluntary commitments and associations. Here, unlike the particularist, the ethical universalist distinguishes personal identity and personal motivations from moral agency. Yet, these distinctions are implausible as moral agency is not a purely rational undertaking and is mixed with personal identity and motivations. Moreover, particularists would note that the universalist’s recognition of the socially constructed nature of commitments has no bearing on the legitimacy of an association, and might instead strengthen the commitment as an act of autonomy to join and identify with certain groups. Here, the universalist is said to “[drive] a wedge between ethical duties

10 Miller, On Nationality, 56.
11 Miller, On Nationality, 56.
12 Miller, On Nationality, 56.
13 Miller, On Nationality, 57.
14 Miller, On Nationality, 57.
and self-identity." \footnote{Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, 57.} Since the associations we make are part of our identities, it would be unfair or unreasonable to expect someone to act according to abstract principles that delegitimize the significance of an individual’s commitments. Furthermore, the particularist makes the case that “ethical life must be a social institution whose principles accommodate natural sentiments.” \footnote{Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, 58.} The ethical universalist relies on a simple set of motives being that of pure rationality when in reality a ‘complex set of motives’ such as “love, pride and shame” as well as rationality drive our convictions. \footnote{Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, 58.}

The last and largest critique of ethical universalism is the appeal put forward by David Miller that, taken to its logical conclusion, ethical universalism would justify benevolent imperialism. If ethical universalists would argue that we all have certain duties to each other, they would also argue that we have a duty to uphold these duties to all of humanity equally. Based on this notion of universal equality, they could not maintain the belief that nations have a non-negotiable right to national self-determination. If the co-nationals of a certain nation were proven to be incompetent in maintaining their duties towards each other, such as basic human rights, it would then follow for the ethical universalist that it would be both necessary and justified to enact a form of benevolent universalism over the members of that nation. For our purposes, benevolent imperialism represents the governance of a nation by foreigners or outsiders in order to ensure basic goods for that nation. These goods can take the form of human rights, but their specific nature is not necessary. The key consideration is that in Miller’s appeal, this form of imperialism is not exploitative in nature or influenced by corruptive forces. Instead, the cleverness of Miller’s critique stems partly from our modern aversion to imperialist practices, both because we regard them as historically exploitative and because we regard the practice of imperialism as inherently immoral.

Someone who adheres to the ethical universalist framework is then limited in their possible responses to Miller’s appeal at a theoretical level. The universalist cannot appeal to historical precedent, the rule of law, or contemporary practice, as this only questions the legitimacy of the assumptions within ethical universalism. An appeal of this sort would only serve to bolster the particularist claim that, in reality, ethical universalism is a rational abstraction of moral principles that is untenable in practice. A legitimate response, however dubious, is to accept Miller’s conclusion and ‘bite the bullet,’ so to speak. While most people might have an aversion to this option, the ethical universalist could say that we do, in fact, have an obligation to protect people whose co-nationals do not guarantee certain rights. Another route the ethical universalist could take is to reject the validity of the conclusion, where an ethical universalist would not have to accept this outcome as a logical conclusion to the theory. However, this rejection would require the ethical universalist to find a fundamental characteristic about a given nation that would deny the legitimacy of foreigners to impose their will on that nation. They would also have to maintain a supplementary position that, even though that characteristic of the nation denies the obligation of foreigners to interfere, it does not justify claims of moral significance regarding the nation and thus partiality towards co-nationals. Taking these necessary positions, the universalist must create an argument showing that nations fulfill a certain vital function for the wellbeing of its members, whose function cannot be performed by members of another nation. Furthermore, this function cannot justify partiality towards co-nationals. Instead, this function must be instrumental in value, as the ethical universalist could not acknowledge that certain functions of the nation are intrinsically good.

Given the parameters of the argument needed to reject Miller’s appeal, we can start by positing that the nation is the most efficient and natural way to administer
general duties we have to each other. Goodin would argue that the nation is a vehicle in which we can efficiently satisfy universal duties through their assignment to a “particular agent,” also called the assigned responsibility model.\textsuperscript{18} The assigned responsibility model approaches special duties we might have to each other and centralizes them onto a selected entity, thus centralizing duties we have towards each other.\textsuperscript{19} For example, Goodin uses the example of a drowning swimmer on the beach. This swimmer is not related to anyone at the beach, nor close to any beachgoer. Additionally, Goodin indicates that all beachgoers are equally strong swimmers. The thought experiment shows that the best person to save the swimmer would be an elected lifeguard. By assigning him the special duty to attend to drowning swimmers, there is no confusion about who is supposed to tend to the swimmer and stops duplication of aid. Above all, the general duties we have to each other are “more effectively discharged by assigning special responsibility.”\textsuperscript{20}

The lifeguard in this example takes on the supposed role of lifeguard within the nation of the beach. Those within the nation in this example should have the ability to assign a lifeguard of their choosing as they know what is best for themselves, and they have the local knowledge to know who would be the best for the lifeguard position. The nation is the most efficient administrator of universal general duties and can be partial to those within the nation. Thus, it appears that this conception of the nation allows the universalist to avoid Miller’s critique. However, the universalist has two problems that prevent this logic from being sufficient to reject Miller’s appeal. The first is that the nation is still only justifiable so long as it fills its administrative function. When an elected lifeguard cannot perform their functions, those special duties fall back on everyone. Goodin states that if appointed individuals are proven to be incompetent, then “it is perfectly proper to retract their commissions and appoint others in their place.”\textsuperscript{21} We would assume at first glance that the judgment of incompetency should come from co-nationals. However, if moral principles are to be applied universally, then the right to judge incompetency is not placed at the national level but the universal level.

Moreover, the assigned responsibility model fails to properly satisfy the function of the nation that would satisfy the necessary argument. Through the assigned responsibility model, the ethical universalist can maintain the position that the nation is not an ethical community, as it is only a vehicle to administer universal duties. Because of this conception, the assigned responsibility model does not justify partiality toward co-nationals, as it is only sufficient to fill one of the necessary positions. Specifically, this model fails because it does not delegitimize imperialism when its responsibilities are not met. The ethical universalist can only use this argument as long as nations can be proven to always carry out their assigned responsibilities. Yet, because many nations today either do not or cannot uphold certain basic human rights for their members, it would appear that the nation cannot be relied upon to always carry out its assigned responsibilities. Furthermore, since the assigned responsibility model only applies to the administration of duties that ethical universalists consider every human capable of performing, when the nation is proven to be incompetent to fulfill these duties those responsibilities fall back on everyone. Therefore, based on these shortcomings, the assigned responsibility model proves insufficient to resolve Miller’s critique.

However, it is possible to find a function of the nation that is instrumental in nature but serves to promote an intrinsic good for nationals. To find this characteristic about the nation, we need to look at the logic of the ‘mutual-benefit-society model’ and expand upon it. The mutual-benefit-society model interprets the nation as a community.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{19}Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 678.
\bibitem{20}Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 681.
\bibitem{21}Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 680.
\end{thebibliography}
Political Theory

from which its members derive benefits. For example, if one pays into a system, such as social insurance or another general welfare scheme, they would benefit from that system. There is nothing in this model that shows an intrinsically good characteristic about the nation, since we can easily ask why membership cannot be extended universally.

The mutual-benefit-society model as it is originally presented does not help the universalist’s case; however, using its framework allows a universalist to posit an intrinsically good characteristic of the nation that cannot be recreated and should not be supplanted by outsiders. Invoking the definition of the nation as a group of people who share a common history, descent, language, and culture, the nation can operate as a mutual benefit society in cultural terms by distributing cultural benefits while still maintaining facets of a person’s identity and group affiliations. This mode’s primary goal is to define what relations people can have that is morally significant enough so that it would be universally accepted as something intrinsically valuable. However, this model also has a necessary caveat, that evil and perverse shared values are not legitimate commonalities. For example, we would not accept a nation created solely by ethno-nationalists, whose identities are tied solely to their race. Since a person’s race does not provide cultural goods, and an identity based around one’s race necessitates exclusionary practices based on one’s own perceived superiority over others, the mutual-benefit-society model would reject this formation for perpetuating evil and perverse values. A community of shared values that are not racially driven will produce more diverse societies, as “there is no race whose members all share the same psychological or moral profile,” and there will be those outside of one’s race who will share this profile.

While racial majorities in different nations may exist due to the world’s different cultural views being more compatible with certain national values, these communities are still legitimate as their shared values, cultural practices, and identities are not fundamentally based on race. Ethical universalists would thus see the case of the ethnostate as part of the inherent arbitrariness of particularism.

If someone’s identity was not based on a value that is morally perverse, it does not seem that an ethical universalist would deny the legitimacy of that identity, even if it was tied to an idea of national belonging. The ethical universalist holds that national ties are not legitimate grounds for moral decision-making, but this does not mean that someone’s national ties are themselves illegitimate. If we were to say that an ethical universalist would support a right to maintain an individual identity as a universal moral principle, then we would have a duty not to interfere with foreigners who participate in a mutual benefit-society of cultural transactions. So then, the universalist would be in a position that holds that people are entitled to a set of basic human rights, including the right to maintain individual identity. The necessary assumption here is that the nation largely informs individual identity. However, many people have complex identities which derive many of the same facets of identity from forms that do not rely on national self-identification.

The universalist would have to question this assumption, or else they would need to acknowledge that national self-identification is not the only means by which an identity can be maintained. However, in many cases, cultural practices are strengthened with interaction with co-nationals. Understanding this assumption, the universalist could posit that it is a universal duty to not degrade or diminish someone’s identity. Here, foreigners would not be able to intervene in a nation insofar that this duty is no longer upheld. Since most imperialist structures are composed mostly of foreigners, these foreigners would not have the capacity to create and foster the cultural goods and

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22 Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 675.
23 McKim and McMahan, The Morality of Nationalism, 125.
24 McKim and McMahan, The Morality of Nationalism, 126.
25 McKim and McMahan, The Morality of Nationalism, 121.
Political Theory

preconditions to sustain preexisting national identities. Therefore, co-nationals fulfill an intrinsic good by fulfilling cultural needs and maintaining identities.

The problem of Miller’s appeal, however, still persists and is even strengthened by an appeal to a duty of noninterference in the case of identity. Ethical universalists hold that an individual “stands apart from and prior to their relationships to other individuals.”26 Even if a universalist accepted that an individual has a right to their identity and this identity is created by their relationships to others, this would acknowledge the particularist’s claim that relationships hold moral significance and that we cannot separate from them. Looking at the mutual-benefit-society model as a way to distribute cultural goods, we are forced to acknowledge individuals within the society have a right to be partial to their co-nationals, as the wellbeing of their co-nationals is directly related to their wellbeing. If the nation is socially constructed, and if we acknowledge that everyone has a universal right to maintain and shape their identity at an individual level, then, in effect, we are also bestowing the right to national self-determination as a legitimate way to foster individual identities where the feeling of belonging to a distinct group is an important element of such identity.

The nation as a mutual benefit society of culture and identity is then insufficient to surpass both positions necessary to reject Miller’s claim. The argument is sufficient to pass one necessary position in that it shows that there is a function of the nation that fulfills a certain human need, that because of its immaterial form cannot be administered by non-nationals. It follows from this function of the nation that because the nation is the source to which people derive elements of their identity, it legitimizes partiality towards co-nationals. Framing the nation in this sense acknowledges that people do not stand apart from their relations. Therefore, an appeal to the irreplaceable function of a nation as an avenue in which identity can be fostered necessarily legitimizes partiality towards co-nationals.

Overall, a case has been made that there is no position an ethical universalist could take to reject David Miller’s appeal to the ethicality of benevolent imperialism. The ethical universalist must hold that nations should not be interfered with through imperialist practices because they alone can perform a certain function for their members, while also defending that nations cannot act impartially towards their members. For the universalist, any effort to satisfy one aspect of the position necessarily fails to satisfy the other aspect. For example, creating a model of the nation that does not justify partiality cannot be at the same time able to be performed by only those within the nation. Conversely, understanding the nation as a method to exchange immaterial goods must then justify partiality if it cannot be performed by foreigners. The significance of the appeal is not only in that it shows that the ethical universalist is caught in a contradictory position, but it also demonstrates that any attempt to reject the appeal out of an aversion to imperialism only serves to critique ethical universalism’s pure reliance on rationality. Here, the reliance on rationality is insufficient for moral decision making because, this type of decision-making rests within a ‘complex set of motives’, both rational and irrational drive our convictions.

26 Miller, On Nationality, 50.
References


Reducing fossil fuel-based greenhouse gas emissions is key to avoiding climate catastrophe within the next decade by keeping global temperatures below 1.5°C. The political economy of energy transitions has gained prominence because low-carbon energy shifts are constrained or accelerated by underlying power structures. Therefore, economic and political-cultural power influences policy decisions and remains central to studying social conditions that limit or enable energy transitions. Two questions arise from this situation: what explains the continued reliance on fossil fuels and how can large-scale structural transformations to low-carbon societies materialise? Three neo-Gramscian theoretical concepts – hegemony, counter-hegemony, and war of position – can help examine the power dynamics underpinning energy transitions in Canada. This essay argues that Counter-hegemonic civil society actors have formed a coalition to dismantle the fossil fuel hegemony in Canada, which has maintained its dominant position in the status quo by exerting influence over political and social institutions. Moreover, I contend that the “just transition” discourse can be interpreted as a “war of position” wherein counter-hegemonic social forces resist the fossil fuel hegemony through an ideological struggle towards a post-carbon and post-capitalist society.

This paper is structured in three parts. In section II, I briefly outline three neo-Gramscian concepts, building a theoretical framework relevant to analyse energy transitions. I contextualise this framework in my case study in section III to demonstrate how the fossil fuel hegemony in Canada reproduces capital accumulation and climate inaction while also generating social consent through discourses of clean growth. In particular, I show how public support for carbon-extractive activities is produced at the interface of ideas, material capabilities, and institutions. In section IV, I argue that the fossil fuel hegemony has been challenged by counter-hegemonic civil society actors demanding a “just transition” to a post-carbon and post-capitalist society. Hence, by centering power relations and ideological contestations, my argument emphasizes the importance of asking “just transition, for whom and why?” in the context of energy politics.

I. Hegemony, Counter-hegemony, and War of Position

Critical theory in International Political Economy (IPE) seeks to analyze power relations, critiquing existing power structures instead of taking them for granted. Influenced by the ideas of Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, scholars in the neo-Gramscian tradition build upon Gramscian ideas to develop a more dynamic explanation of social orders. In particular, neo-Gramscian epistemology offers a nuanced understanding of power, domination, and resistance through the oppositional concepts of...
hedegemoney and counter-hegemony. While problem-solving theories define hegemony largely in terms of the economic and military power of states, hegemony in the Gramscian sense entails the socio-cultural significance of ideas in maintaining a particular social order.\textsuperscript{4} To elaborate, hegemony is maintained through coercion (state violence) and consent of the subordinate class, with the latter occupying a central role in neo-Gramscian theory.\textsuperscript{5} The dominant social class presents certain ideas as universal and in the general interest of the public with the aim of gaining their consent.\textsuperscript{6} Hegemony is the process by which the dominant social class articulates an ideology that is accepted as “common sense” because it appears to benefit the public while enabling the dominant class to retain its social position. Therefore, consensual leadership is central to the maintenance of hegemony.

Building upon Gramsci’s foundational concept of hegemony, Neo-Gramscian scholars, most notably Robert Cox, argue that hegemony is the outcome of the interaction between ideas, material capabilities, and institutions.\textsuperscript{7} In other words, ideas are grounded in material reality and institutional practices. As Buttigieg notes, hegemony functions through social and cultural institutions to shape practices that are consistent with the ideology of the dominant social class.\textsuperscript{8} Hence, a neo-Gramscian analysis views ideas, material capabilities, and institutions as interconnected variables that create a stable social order.\textsuperscript{9} However, Cox argues that social orders cannot remain stable over time because hegemony is never complete; it needs to be reproduced and legitimated constantly.\textsuperscript{10} In Williams’ words, “hegemony is resisted, limited, altered, and challenged by social pressures.”\textsuperscript{11} Here, the “common sense” ideology of the dominant social class is resisted by the subordinate class. Thus, challenges to the dominant ideology and social order give rise to “counter-hegemony.” These ideological battles emerge in the realm of civil society which comprises non-state actors and institutions. For this reason, the “integral” or “extended” state comprising political society (the state apparatus) and civil society (non-state actors) is introduced in neo-Gramscian theory to capture the dialectical relation between state and civil society.\textsuperscript{12} As such, neo-Gramscian scholars focus on the extended state as a crucial realm to study hegemonic power within a social order.

Counter-hegemony, which refers to attempts at opposing or dismantling hegemonic power, is an important analytical concept in neo-Gramscianism for two reasons. First, counter-hegemonic struggles cannot be reduced to class struggle. Counter-hegemonic social forces also comprise marginalised non-class identities, such as gender, race, sexuality and other characteristics, that resist different – and often intersecting – forms of exploitation within the dominant social order.\textsuperscript{13} Hence, counter-hegemony is built through solidarity across diverse social struggles. Second, the emergence of a counter-hegemonic class also represents the potential for transformative social change. The process by which the counter-hegemonic class attempts to radically transform the dominant social order has been termed as the “war of position.”\textsuperscript{14} As Cox writes, the “war

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, p.134
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, p.172
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p.169
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p.191
of position” entails the creation of “alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society.” In other words, the subordinate class confronts the dominant class by envisioning an alternate social order. Furthermore, the war of position represents a prolonged, gradual transformation through ideological and cultural change. Thus, neo-Gramscian concepts provide a theoretical foundation to analyse radical social change (or lack thereof) through the lens of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic social forces, as well as the war of position.

Although Gramscian concepts have usually been applied to case studies of state formation and behaviour, these analytical tools have recently been applied to neoliberal environmental governance. As Worth and Morton contend, neo-Gramscian concepts have the potential to be applied beyond state-centric analysis in IPE. Thus, the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework developed in this section can be deployed to analyze and evaluate contemporary energy transitions. In particular, because fossil fuels continue to dominate energy systems globally and remain deeply embedded within everyday life under capitalism, the concept of hegemony will be applied to examine the extent of the fossil fuel industry’s power. Moreover, the fossil fuel industry as a hegemonic power can be critically examined not solely through the lens of economic influence, but also through its widespread leverage on civil and political society.

Furthermore, large-scale structural transformations such as energy transitions also need to be situated in the context of historical, material, and political factors. In this regard, the concept of integral state highlights emerging social pressures, civil society groups, and institutional practices that drive energy transitions. In particular, civil society groups comprising labour unions, environmental NGOs, climate activists, and other social justice organisations have been vocal in articulating fossil fuel divestment norms, within and across states. These social forces typically voice counter-hegemonic demands, such as a “just transition” which challenges the carbon-extractive growth-oriented discourse of the fossil fuel industry and centres social justice in the transition to low-carbon futures. Thus, my paper critically examines discourses of energy transitions, focusing on the role of civil society in accepting and/or challenging hegemony, and how neo-Gramscian concepts are applied throughout the case study of Canada’s energy transition.

II. Fossil fuel hegemony and the (re)production of climate inaction

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Political Theory

In the past few years, Canada has been championed as a climate leader for demanding stronger climate policies within international climate change negotiations.\textsuperscript{24} However, despite setting net-zero targets and introducing legislation to curb carbon emissions, the Trudeau administration continues to invest in the expansion of oil and gas infrastructure.\textsuperscript{25} For instance, the Canadian government spent $4.5 billion on the Trans Mountain oil pipeline extension project in 2018, which would not only increase the country’s total oil production capacity but also lead to significantly higher carbon emissions.\textsuperscript{26} While Canada’s hypocrisy has been condemned by social justice organisations and environmental campaigners, a survey conducted in 2019 demonstrated that a majority of Canadians (58\%) still regard oil expansion as important for Canada’s national and economic interests.\textsuperscript{27} Public support for fossil fuel-led growth remains puzzling especially since Canadians consistently rank climate change as a top priority issue.\textsuperscript{28} The seemingly contradictory public support for fossil fuel-led growth can be explained by examining the role of the fossil fuel sector in creating discursive and institutional practices that encourage climate inaction.

The fossil fuel sector maintains a hegemonic position in Canada, influencing energy and climate policy at the national and subnational scale.\textsuperscript{29} With demands for renewables growing stronger in recent years, the fossil fuel industry and the state have been pressured to invest in clean energy production.\textsuperscript{30} However, the fossil fuel sector has accommodated these demands without changing its core extractive practices by creating a “clean growth” discourse.\textsuperscript{31} To elaborate, the clean growth discourse promotes incremental shifts to renewable energy while simultaneously portraying energy expansion as fundamental for Canada’s national and economic interests.\textsuperscript{32} The concept of clean growth acknowledges the damage caused by burning fossil fuels, but fails to decarbonise the energy sector at the scale necessary to meet emissions reduction targets. Instead, the fossil fuel sector portrays itself as taking action on climate change while retaining its carbon-extractive capitalist growth model. Furthermore, the clean growth discourse can also be interpreted as an ideological element to construct social consent in order to maintain fossil fuel interests and capitalist relations of production.\textsuperscript{33} Five major corporations dominate Canada’s fossil fuel industry, possessing enormous material resources and economic power.\textsuperscript{34} The fossil fuel sector directs its material resources to

\textsuperscript{24} McKibben, B., 2020. “When it comes to climate hypocrisy, Canada’s leaders have reached a new low.” The Guardian. 5 February 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low
\textsuperscript{25} McKibben, B., 2020. “When it comes to climate hypocrisy, Canada’s leaders have reached a new low.” The Guardian. 5 February 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid
civil society organisations to construct public support for clean growth and to drive policies that are compatible with fossil fuel interests.\(^{35}\)

Moreover, the fossil fuel sector plays a large part in knowledge-production and policymaking. Carroll et al. conduct a network analysis tracing an elite network of policy institutes, think tanks, NGOs, and universities which receive funding from the fossil fuel sector.\(^{36}\) This study complements previous research highlighting the link between fossil fuel investments and the production of policy statements that promote clean growth initiatives at regional and national level.\(^{37}\) Fossil fuel-funded research institutes and NGOs advocate for market-based policy solutions to climate change, which are largely compatible with the current carbon-extractive capitalist economy.\(^{38}\) Subsequently, the knowledge produced by research institutes also translates into policy decisions. One prominent policy example includes the creation of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change set up to “meet emissions reduction targets, grow the economy, and build climate resilience.”\(^{39}\) Here, the complexities and contradictions within such a policy framework become apparent, especially since clean growth initiatives can have a positive impact on communities. For instance, the Pan-Canadian Framework has created provisions for the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and coal industry workers within clean growth discussions.\(^{40}\) However, two problems persist within the clean growth discourse. First, while clean growth initiatives may create material gains for marginalised communities, unequal capitalist power relations remain unchallenged. Second, although clean growth initiatives promote climate action, incremental shifts that fail to tackle the underlying carbon-extractive capitalist growth model remain insufficient to meet emissions reduction targets.\(^{41}\) Through investments in the cultural and political institutions, the fossil fuel industry shapes policies that do not obstruct future fossil fuel expansion and profit accumulation.

In addition to the knowledge-production sector, fossil fuel interests are also entrenched in Canadian media. To demonstrate this, Stoddart and Smith’s analysis of the portrayal of climate change in Canadian media concludes that the climate-related issues are “framed through the lens of Canadian national interests, downplaying climate-related social impacts.”\(^{42}\) In particular, negative effects of oil expansion on indigenous communities as well as discourses of ‘climate justice’ are side-lined within media depictions of the climate crisis.\(^{43}\) This analysis shows that the material power of the fossil fuel sector extends into social and cultural institutions to shape and promote a capitalist way of life in which fossil fuel extraction remains inevitable.\(^{44}\) Thus, fossil fuel expansion is portrayed as a necessity for Canada’s national and economic interests.

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38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
Political Theory

So far, I have argued that the fossil fuel sector in Canada maintains its hegemonic position in Canada by utilising its material power to construct social consent within civil society, and simultaneously promote policy responses that are compatible with fossil fuelled capitalist growth. Hence, the fossil fuel hegemony leads to the perpetuation of climate inaction. In the next section, I proceed to argue that the fossil fuel hegemony in Canada has not remained unchallenged.

III. ‘Just Transition’ as a War of Position

While the fossil fuel sector has influenced civil society and policy decisions, its hegemonic position is characterised by instability. In recent years, the fossil fuel sector and the state have faced resistance from a coalition of civil society groups comprising Indigenous rights networks, trade unions, environmental activists, and policy think tanks that seek to subvert the hegemonic discourse of carbon-dependent capitalist growth. These diverse groups have mobilised to promote a counter-hegemonic ‘just transition’ discourse that looks to connect social justice struggles to climate action by placing justice and equity at the centre of energy transitions. I contend that “just transition” can be interpreted as a “war of position” because it represents an ideological struggle towards a post-carbon and post-capitalist social order. Through an analysis of policy documents published by two civil society actors – the Indigenous Environmental Network and Policy Alternatives – I highlight two counter-hegemonic framings of “just transition.”

First, the just transition discourse politicies energy transitions by foregrounding unequal power relations that underpin the ownership, production, and consumption of energy. In particular, this discourse critiques the dominance of elite interests in energy transitions, which perpetuates fossil fuel dependency within a capitalist system. This has been complemented by demands for the democratisation of energy from the current fossil fuel-dominated system to a community-owned renewable energy model. As Carroll et al. state, the just transition entails a “double power shift” from fossil fuel-based energy to renewables (decarbonisation) and from corporate to democratic control (democratisation). As such, it presents an alternative vision of a society that is both post-carbon and post-capitalist. Therefore, the counter-hegemonic discourse demonstrates the urgency to shift away from high-carbon energy production as well as the need to democratise ownership of the means of energy production.

Second, the just transition discourse also highlights systemic inequalities within the current energy system by pointing to the implications of energy distribution. For instance, core demands in a just transition include distributive justice claims such as compensation for workers who face job losses as a result of low-carbon transitions and


reparations for damages inflicted upon Indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{53,54} In addition to the distribution of benefits and burdens, procedural justice claims such as “who sets the terms of transition, and why” have also been central to just transition demands.\textsuperscript{55} To be more concise, counter-hegemonic demands centre on the redistribution of power and decision-making.\textsuperscript{56} Hence, power relations remain the focal point of just transitions. Moreover, a comparative analysis of clean growth demonstrates the differences between the two discourses. Clean growth initiatives adopt a reformist – not transformative – approach to social change by taking power relations for granted.\textsuperscript{57} On the contrary, the just transition discourse challenges fossil fuel capitalism by underscoring the questions “for whom and why?” Here, by subverting capitalist relations and the fossil fuel status quo through a process of ideological and cultural struggle, the “just transition” discourse can also be seen as a “war of position”.

Moreover, the just transition movement in Canada, underpinned by a strong commitment to tackling inequalities in energy transitions, has also created possibilities for transformative social change by building solidarity across counter-hegemonic groups. Similar mobilisations in Germany and Australia have resulted in substantial gains for workers and marginalised communities.\textsuperscript{58,59} However, counter-hegemonic demands also face constraints within the existing social order. Newell warns that the “just transition” discourse can be co-opted by the capitalist status quo by accommodating demands which do not disrupt the social order such as the creation of “green jobs.”\textsuperscript{60} This raises an important point: while the idea of a just transition has been successful in mobilising civil society, the agency of counter-hegemonic groups is still limited due to material advantages and institutional practices that favour the dominant social class.\textsuperscript{61} This highlights the need for future research to be directed towards understanding the social conditions under which counter-hegemonic demands can translate into transformative policy gains despite significant pushback from the existing social order.

\section*{IV. Conclusion}

To conclude, the fossil fuel hegemony in Canada reproduces climate inaction through incremental shifts towards clean energy while continuing to expand carbon-extractive practices. Moreover, the interaction between ideas, material capabilities, and institutions can be demonstrated through the construction of the clean growth discourse promoted by fossil fuel-funded research institutes and subsequently adopted by institutional policies. However, over the last decade, fossil fuel hegemony has been challenged by a counter-hegemonic coalition of actors demanding a “just transition.” The discourse surrounding a just transition can be viewed as a “war of position” that seeks to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} See Deshpande, Z and Mertins-Kirkwood, H., 2019. “Who is included in a Just Transition?: Considering social equity in Canada’s shift to a zero-carbon economy.”\textit{Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.}
\item \textsuperscript{54} IEN 2020 “Indigenous Principles of Just Transition.” \textit{Indigenous Environmental Network}. Available at: https://www.ienearth.org/justtransition/
\item \textsuperscript{57} Carroll, W., Graham, N., Shakespear, M., 2020. “Foundations, E-NGOs- Clean Growth Networks and the Integral State.” \textit{Canadian Journal of Sociology}. Vol. 55, No.2, p.113
\item \textsuperscript{59} See Fairbrother, P and Snell, D., 2012. “Just transition and labour environmentalism in Australia” \textit{Trade Unions in the Green Economy: Working for the Environment.}, edited by Räthzel, N and Uzzell, D
\end{itemize}
transform the dominant social order through ideological and cultural change towards a post-capitalist and post-carbon society. Thus, analysing the power relations and contesting visions in Canada’s energy transitions also demonstrates the significance of neo-Gramscian theoretical concepts in explaining emancipatory social change.
Political Theory

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Political Theory


Political Theory


Section 4:

Comparative Politics

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Featuring:

“Religious Nationalism & Identity Politics: Understanding the Denial of Indonesia’s Islamic State”

Written by Nurrisha Ismail
National University of Singapore, Political Science Major, Class of 2023
Comparative Politics

Religious Nationalism & Identity Politics: Understanding the Denial of Indonesia’s Islamic State

Nurrisha Ismail

Introduction

“Merdeka atau mati!” (Freedom or death!) and “Allahu Akbar!” (God is the greatest!), these were the rallying calls of Muslim revolutionaries in Indonesia at the height of the anti-colonial struggle for independence against the Dutch administration. After years of struggle against Dutch colonization and attempts to dismantle the nominal declaration of independence in 1945 following the Japanese Imperial Army’s surrender, this marked a pinnacle moment for Indonesian Muslims. In a country where 87 percent of the population is comprised of Muslims, culminating in the largest Muslim-populated state in the world, the historic relevance of Islamic groups in Indonesia acting within both political and civil society by the turn of the 20th century is especially significant. Religious leaders held considerable sway amongst adherents while Islamic educational schools were widely attended. Prominent Islamic organizations which endorsed the anti-colonial resistance began to emerge, including Sarekat Islam (SI), Muhammadiyah, Persis (Islamic Union) and Nadhlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization sustained by approximately fifty million members. Considering the vastly diverse cultural practices, languages, and customs observed across Indonesia, it is critical to acknowledge the acute role that Islam played as a binding force in the rally against colonial rule since the pre-independence period of the 1900s. It mobilized the masses in support of the nascent nationalist movement that was emerging, particularly through framing the nationalist discourse in the context of religion as a point of coalescence and inspiration.

This then begs the empirical puzzle as to why an Islamic state premised on the implementation of Shari’ā law and ideological tenets of the faith serving as the underpinnings of Indonesian national identity, has failed to rise in Indonesia. Despite Muslims forming a religious majority in the country and Islam playing a pertinent role in contributing to the anti-colonial resistance which rescued the state from Dutch colonization. This paper argues that Indonesia has failed to become an Islamic state due to the competing conceptions of national identity in post-independent Indonesia between reformist Muslims which advocated for an Islamic state, and secular nationalists which firmly opposed this goal. The concept of nationalism is the cornerstone of this conflict, as it sheds light on how Islamic predominance was curtailed by secular nationalists. This is demonstrated by proponents of secular nationalism which have strategically outmaneuvered advocates of an Islamic state through establishing a broad-based collective identity of Indonesian unity that excluded Islamists. Secularists launched forceful campaigns of subjugation as a means to fortify their hold on political power while decimating the capacity for Islamists to pursue their agenda.

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1 Kevin W. Fogg, Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 50.
3 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 180.
4 Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, 179-180.
Comparative Politics

I. Theory of Religious Nationalism and National Identity in Indonesia: Accounting for Islamic State Aspirations

This section seeks to demonstrate how Islamic nationalism, and aspirations to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state, was the result of Muslim proponents striving to protect and promulgate their distinct conception of Indonesian national identity. This identity was built upon a combination of Islamic ideology and the Indonesian nationalist discourse of emancipation from the Dutch. The tenuous identity of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, after having achieved nominal independence in 1945 and replete sovereignty in 1949 from the Dutch, was aptly encapsulated by Adrian Vickers as “[an] imperfect new nation that had been born of the fire of occupation and revolution.” This sentiment reaffirms the understanding that Indonesia’s pathway to independence and sovereignty was by no means straightforward. Inter-group contestations between the reformist-modernist Muslims, traditionalist Muslims, secular nationalists and Communists were rife, based on their respectively divergent interests and imaginations of post-independent Indonesia. According to Benedict Anderson, nationhood is socially constructed as an ‘imagined community’ by political constituents and civil society, creating a deep-rooted sense of camaraderie between individuals who collectively identify as belonging to the same limited borders and sovereign territory, premised on catalyzing factors such as shared beliefs, attitudes or history. It is precisely because the nascent Indonesian state cultivated political associations and a civil society that brandished a multitude of ideological streams that inter-group antagonisms grew profoundly prevalent as the secular nationalists, Communists, and Muslims comprising of the traditionalist abangan (syncretic) and reformist santri (orthodox) sub-groups, struggled to institutionalize their particularistic versions of national identity corresponding to their respective beliefs.

Theory of Religious Nationalism

Nations are generally defined by territorial boundaries that are recognizably unique from others premised on shared characteristics that make up the construction of the ‘imagined community’. Naturally, religion can serve as an important point of reference in determining what constitutes the in-group and out-group of nations. Friedland’s seminal work on religious nationalism unpacks the phenomenon as a type of collective action that is particularly potent in its capacity to mobilize adherents. It confers authority premised on the all-encompassing and transcendental qualities of faith, which it both commands and subsists upon. As a framework of authority, it is the supreme power that governs over a political community of adherents and the preservation of said group is entirely contingent upon the commandments of God as the foundational premise of the state. At this juncture, Joseph Liow’s assertion is useful in highlighting the nuance of religious nationalism in contrast to that of non-religious types of nationalism. Where the state is understood as the political manifestation of nationalism premised on shared definitive traits, religious nationalists identify such traits solely in the context of religious faith. Religious aspirations are fused with the country’s character and religiosity is synonymous with patriotism.

8 Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, 44-45.
11 Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, 44.
Religious nationalism may prevail over other modes of nationalism where there is a desire amongst constituents of the territory to unite under an alternative political order. Friedland highlights that religious nationalism is adopted in hopes of elevating and pursuing the sanctity of cultural identity over the materialist politics of class. However, it can also be construed as the reassertion of religious identity to the fore of political life and national identity. This is the natural response of the newly emancipated state after former colonial subjugation, where the politicization of religion may have previously been stifled and disparaged based on the supplantation of Western ideals of modernity and 'civility'.

Islam, Nationalism, and National Identity in Indonesia

The logic that connects the three variables of Islam, nationalism, and national identity can be argued as such; reformist-modernist Muslims believed Islam to be the rightful ideological framework of the newly independent nation-state, in which nationalist anti-colonial resistance was carried out in the name of God and effectively fought as a holy war. Victory for Muslims would mean liberation from marginalization and subjugation while Islam would be embraced as the governing authority of the Muslim-populated state. Driven by the resurgence of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, santri reformist-modernist Muslims grew assertive of their conception of Islam as the resolutely unimpaired answer to Indonesia’s political framework and ordering of power. This was catalyzed by the emergence of civil society organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama, the rise of religious leaders’ involvements in pesantren education (Islamic boarding schools), and the advancement of communicative technology through print media in pre-independence Indonesia.

The result of the Islamic Indonesian state is best reflected by the writing of Mohammad Natsir, an ardent proponent of the Islamic nation state, and Indonesia’s fifth prime minister. Natsir affirmed that Islamic nationalism should be understood, firstly, as opposing colonialism, thus reflecting the absolute necessity for Muslims to fight in the holy war on behalf of the Indonesian state. Secondly, he also believed that nationalism was the answer to the independent state where Islam would serve as the foundational ideology, and the duty of Muslim adherents was to ensure the realization of Islamic precepts in organizing the newly emancipated state. Therefore, Muslim involvement in the anti-colonial struggle would secure liberation where the realization of the Islamic state would subsequently serve as the manifestation of said freedom. Thus, Fogg’s discourse highlights how the ulama (Islamic religious leaders) encompassed a critical role of catalyzing Muslims to think of nationalism in religious terms, while acting with the intentions of achieving the ideals Natsir had laid out through issuing multiple fatwa (legal opinions for Islamic guidance). Fogg presented the struggle against the Dutch as mandatory upon the Islamic community, in the form of jihad (holy war). His work also demonstrates how Muslims grew to perceive nationalism as freedom of religion, as opposed to freedom of religious expression. This reaffirmed that the struggle for freedom was indeed for the liberation and ascent of Islam to reign supreme in the newly independent state. Through the implementation of Shari’ah law, Indonesian national identity was intrinsically linked to Muslim identity. Considering the tenacity and commitment of Muslims to the Islamic nationalist cause, the following sections will

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13 Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, 23-30.
15 Fogg, Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution, 55-56.
16 Ibid., 51-52.
explore the reasons as to why the Islamic state as an end goal of the nationalist struggle for sovereignty did not come to fruition.

**II. Denial of Indonesia’s Islamic State: Secular Nationalists as Supreme Arbiters**

This section argues that an Islamic state failed to feasibly emerge and consolidate as the proponents of secular nationalism recognized the salience of political Islam. Secularists saw adherents of an Islamic state as a threat to their vision. This culminated in the secular nationalist platform that deliberately appealed to the broadest base of constituents, while intentionally excluding reformist-modernist Muslim nationalists who sought to implement an Islamic state. Further, secularists’ successive campaigns of political repression across Sukarno’s and Suharto’s periods of rule prevented Islamists from meaningfully pursuing their agenda. While the reformist-modernist Muslims may not have been the most strategic political competitors since they prioritized religious deliberation over political outbidding, Sukarno was a proficient political tactician. He could recognize that the victory of the secular nationalists in the struggle towards assuming foremost political authority over governance in the new independent state depended upon galvanizing horizontal support across supporters, bound by feelings of camaraderie. The exclusion of Islamists from this in-group rendered the political influence of the Islamists to the periphery of the political arena, thus substantially extinguishing the group’s potency and capacity to mobilize and install an Islamic state.

**The Secular Nationalist Conception of Post-Independent Indonesia**

The secular nationalist political elites did not conceive of a post-independent Indonesia founded upon the tenets of Islam and its ordering of power. This would have directly threatened their political salience and prospects of holding positions of authority in the new Republic. Considering that these political elites had risen to prominence through Western structures of power as implemented by the colonial administration, overturning this framework to ensure an Islamic political order of power would essentially translate into the invalidation of the political authority that the secular nationalists once harnessed. Therefore, their commitment to denying the emergence of an Islamic state stemmed from the likelihood of suffering political and economic losses under the political framework of an Islamic state where the ulama and santri reformist-modernists would naturally replace secular nationalists as the new class of political elites. Further, they feared the incitement of social uprising and rebellion amongst groups fervently opposed to the idea of an Islamic state, where secular nationalists would suffer incontroversible losses in electoral support and political dominance for having ceded provisions of Islamic governance.

In understanding how Sukarno and his nationalist party, the Indonesian National Party (PNI), were capable of uniting diverse individuals that diverged across religious beliefs and ideologies under one banner, it is critical to acknowledge that secular nationalist ideology is just as potent in commanding the submission of its followers as religious ideology. Juergensmeyer similarly puts forth the argument that secular nationalism, much like religion, serves as an answer to collective solidarity and a framework of authority made functional by the binding acquiescence of constituents, otherwise framed as a social contract.\(^{17}\) He affirms that religious and secular nationalism are antagonistic, since both ideologies compete to rise as the supreme guarantor of order in the state and the highest prevailing authority.\(^{18}\) Thus, the success of PNI’s coalescence and resilience can be attributed to Sukarno’s mastery of shaping political ideology to successfully craft a collective identity, premised on the notion of ‘Unity in Diversity,’ and

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Comparative Politics

organized upon the precepts of 'Pancasila' (five principles).\textsuperscript{19} This ultimately mirrored the organizational functionality and potency of religious commandments in mobilizing adherents. These five principles consisted of the belief in one God, the unity of Indonesia, internationalism, consultative democracy and social justice; the sole ideology encompassing Indonesia's entire national character and identity.\textsuperscript{20} While the principle of belief in one God could be contested as a non-secular principle, the ideology in itself is premised on the notion of freedom of religion, without the specific decree of any particular religion dictating national identity or character.

The Secular Nationalist Campaign of Offensives: Strategic Political Curtailment of Political Islam

This section utilizes the authoritarian political eras of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957-1965) and Suharto’s New Order regime (1965-1998) as case studies in elucidating the contention that the secular nationalist oriented leaders, Sukarno and Suharto, wielded Pancasila ideology as an exclusionary means of fortifying their political domination against the threat of Islamist supremacy, while curtailing the political strength of the Islamist faction. Bertrand argues that the ways in which Sukarno and Suharto tackled the issue of Islamic state aspirations are parallel, in that they exercised force to quell the political salience of Islam during their respective periods of rule. This occurred through banning Islamic political representation and participation in both elections and civil society, as well as the use of military aggression to suppress Islamist-driven uprisings and thwart the ability for groups to carry out a sustained mobilization in the name of implementing Shari’ā law across the Republic.\textsuperscript{21}

Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, The Jakarta Charter, and Darul Islam Rebellion

Sukarno served as the first president of Indonesia, from 1945 to 1967, following the nominal transfer of power from Japanese troops and subsequent recognition of Indonesian sovereignty on the part of the Dutch after the revolution. His administration wielded their victory against Dutch resistance to appeal to their constituents and promote their secular nationalist idea of Indonesian unity and character.\textsuperscript{22} Despite promulgating the ideal of ‘Unity in Diversity’ as the raison d’etre of the Pancasila secular nationalist ideology, Sukarno’s political incumbency was denoted by its repression of the Islamic cause when his administration and colleagues from the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) omitted the Shari’a clause from the Jakarta Charter in the final version of the Indonesian constitution. The seven-word clause, which proclaimed the obligation for Indonesians to be governed under Shari’a law, had initially been included in the draft version of the post-colonial constitution of 1945, referencing the imperative role Muslim nationalists encompassed in the anti-colonial revolution and the importance to which they associated the liberated state as that of the Islamic state. Sukarno was ultimately the key figure that decided against the inclusion of the clause—enumerating in its place the five principles of Pancasila as the supreme ideology that Indonesians were to adhere to instead.\textsuperscript{23} Hence, amidst contestations across numerous ideological streams, Sukarno and the proponents of secular nationalism posed the biggest obstacle to Islamist aspirations from the inception of the independent Republic, in which the implementation of Shari’a law was deemed incompatible with Pancasila ideology and


\textsuperscript{21} Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 72-73.

\textsuperscript{22} Jacques Bertrand, “Indonesia and Timor-Leste,” in Political Change in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 44.

\textsuperscript{23} Law, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, 184-186.
the idea of unity that it promoted. This version of unity was built upon the Western political framework and capitalist-developmental administration that had been inherited from the Dutch administration and had bolstered the politician to prominence in the first place. The secular nationalists ultimately sought to ensure their vision of post-independent Indonesia came to fruition, premised on political support of the Indonesian people and the existing developmental-capitalist democratic regime which continued to privilege their political dominance, thus resulting in the decision to omit the Shari’ā clause at the expense and exclusion of the Islamists. Following this major political outmaneuver which shattered the hopes of Islamic liberation in the new nation-state as Muslim adherents had originally envisioned, the campaign to curtail Islam from the fore of the political sphere was strengthened through the increased suppression of Islamic political participation and representation. This involved Sukarno’s heavy-handed move towards banning Masyumi, a prominent and active political party that was devoted to the cause of the Indonesian Islamic state, following the 1955 parliamentary elections. Sukarno also deployed troops of the central government to stamp out Islamist-based rebellions that spawned from feelings of betrayal and discontent surrounding the 1945 constitution—culminating in the consolidation of his authoritarian regime in 1959.24

The Darul Islam rebellion, which reached its zenith during the Dutch anti-colonial resistance between 1945 and 1949, is a vital case towards demonstrating how Sukarno’s plan to institute secular nationalist ideology in Indonesia relied upon decimating the threat of political Islam and Islamic state aspirations. Islamists, who mobilized due to the struggle for the independent Republic based on Islamic ideology, were brutally crushed by the armed forces of the Republic on the orders of the secular nationalist political elites. Paradoxically, Sukarno was instead willing to extend a cooperative stance in relation to the Dutch enemy. To its leader, Kartosuwirjo, the Darul Islam rebellion was a movement where Islam served as its ideological basis and primary cause for mobilization. It sought to leverage the collective solidarity of supporters from West Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh, to apply pressure on the central government of secular nationalist political elites.25 Kartosuwirjo perceived the armistice that the Indonesian Republic had conceded to the Dutch in March 1947 as proof of extended collaboration with the colonizers, at the expense of the independence of the Republic, and a second iteration of betrayal after the omission of the Shari’ā clause in the 1945 constitution.26 Consequently, the notion that the secular nationalist political elites were inherently anti-Islamist was further accentuated when Darul Islam militant fighters violently opposed the Dutch re-invasion of West Java as the self-proclaimed ‘Indonesian Islamic State.’27 As opposed to incorporating the desires of Islamists in the unity that Sukarno promulgated, the military campaign that was launched in quelling the rebellion, reasserted the idea that secular nationalist unity was particularistic and Islamists had been excluded from this in-group from the outset.

**Suharto’s New Order, Political Representation, and Muslim-Christian Contestations**

President Suharto’s New Order regime rose to power after he successfully led the army in suppressing a coup attempt on September 30, 1965, which led to the deaths of 6 high-ranking military officials. The massacre was allegedly inflicted by Communist sympathizers from within the ranks of the army as well as the Communist Party, although the validity of this recount remains a point of contention and debate amongst historians. The subsequent mass killings of 1965-1966, founded upon anti-Communist rhetoric, demonstrated how Suharto and his administration were capable of manipulating

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24 Zakaria Al-Anshori, “The Role of Islam in Indonesia’s Contemporary Foreign Policy” (dissertation, 2016), 39.
26 Ibid., 115
27 Ibid., 116.
accusations of Communist support to clamp down on dissent. Ultimately, this monopoly of power paved the way to his appointment as second President of the Republic and the ouster of Sukarno by the People’s Consultative Assembly.\textsuperscript{28}

While Suharto did not specifically brand himself as a secular nationalist, he played a key role towards perpetuating the secular nationalist legacies of Sukarno in the way that he upheld and enforced \textit{Pancasila} ideology as the foundational basis and principal ordering of power in the state, thus curtailing Islamists from pursuing their own state agenda. Similar to that of Sukarno and the Dutch colonial administration, Suharto was inherently wary of reformist-modernist adherents of Islam.\textsuperscript{29} Although he accommodated cultural manifestations of the faith, political expressions of Islam were fervently met with military aggression and restricted from parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{29}

Suharto eradicated Islamic political representation and articulation of interests through merging the four existing Islamic-based political parties into a single party, \textit{Partai Persatuan Pembangunan} (PPP). The party was organizationally restructured in accordance with \textit{Pancasila} ideology instead, in which it was stripped of any affiliation to Islam and coerced into excluding symbols connected to the faith. Although this was meant to be accepted as the upholding of nominal religious representation, ideological conformity to secular ideology had been forcibly imposed and political expression of Islam was essentially withdrawn from legality.\textsuperscript{30}

Furthermore, Suharto had strategically inhibited orthodox santri Muslims from joining the ranks of the civil service. Instead, an overwhelming majority of Christians were co-opted to fulfill positions of the bureaucracy as a concerted attempt to consolidate the alienation of Islamists from potentially fracturing his base of power which was premised upon \textit{Pancasila} ideology. Christians and nominal abangan Muslims willingly supported his regime based on the shared agenda of preventing Islamic state aspirations from rising to the fore.\textsuperscript{31} This period of Christian political salience during the New Order regime ignited feelings of aggravation on the part of orthodox Muslims, who perceived Suharto’s privileging of Christians as a form of neo-colonialism, mirroring Dutch policies which previously denied Muslims access to power. Furthermore, Christian missionary activities that were conducted publicly generated overwhelming feelings of antagonism on the part of Muslims towards both Christians and New Order regime, in the face of the curtailment of political Islam.\textsuperscript{32}

Ultimately, while Suharto’s New Order may have taken an Islamic turn in the later years of the regime, this could be attributed as a hard-pressed decision arising from the need to widen his political base of supporters to maintain political power, as a result of the administration’s inducement of economic crises and social upheaval, besides accounting for his own personal rise in religiosity over the years. This shift in tide was too little, too late in potentially developing the necessary conditions for the resurgence of Islamic state aspirations considering that Suharto’s earlier repressive strategies had been highly effective in crushing the opportunities and capacity for Islamists to mobilize, while a substantial group of Muslims adopted \textit{Pancasila} politically, opting to practice Islam in a personal capacity in acquiescence.

\textbf{III. Conclusion}

Ultimately, this paper has worked to present answers to the empirical puzzle as to why an Islamic state has failed to rise in Indonesia, despite its overwhelming Muslim-majority population, while analyzing the critical role that Muslim revolutionaries encompassed during the Dutch anti-colonial struggle towards liberating the state. This

\textsuperscript{28} Bertrand, “Indonesia and Timor-Leste,” in \textit{Political Change in Southeast Asia}, 50-51.

\textsuperscript{29} Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, “The Rise Of Islamic Religious-Political Movements in Indonesia: The Background, Present Situation and Future,” \textit{Journal of Indonesian Islam} 2, no. 2 (January 2008), 341-342.


\textsuperscript{31} Liow, \textit{Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia}, 187-188.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 189.
Comparative Politics

paper has argued that the secular nationalist political elites harbored a different conception of post-independent Indonesia from that of the reformist-modernist Muslim adherents who desired to live under the governance of Shari’ā law, where political Islam would serve as the foundational basis and supreme authority of the country. As a result, secular nationalists deliberately curtailed the salience of Islam from the political arena, where political elites strategically outmaneuvered Islamists by crafting a collective identity of unity that excluded them, while launching campaigns of subjugation towards decimating their capacity to meaningfully pursue their agenda of an Islamic state. In highlighting the prospects for future research based on the findings of this paper, it would be useful to explore how intra-Muslim antagonisms have contributed towards inhibiting the actualization of an Islamic state, considering that Islamic-based civil society groups have variously altered their respective stances pertaining to the question of the Islamic state. Furthermore, it would be useful to uncover how the increasing co-optation of ulama to high level political offices in present-day Indonesia, following the greater politicization of Islamic values in recent years, has been comfortably facilitated by the central government without fears of facing renewed calls to reform the Republic as an Islamic state.


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